35 ideas
7623 | For ancient Greeks being wise was an ethical value [Putnam] |
4714 | Putnam's epistemic notion of truth replaces the realism of correspondence with ontological relativism [Putnam, by O'Grady] |
15557 | Verisimilitude has proved hard to analyse, and seems to have several components [Lewis] |
7617 | Before Kant, all philosophers had a correspondence theory of truth [Putnam] |
4716 | The correspondence theory is wrong, because there is no one correspondence between reality and fact [Putnam, by O'Grady] |
7616 | Truth is an idealisation of rational acceptability [Putnam] |
14203 | Intension is not meaning, as 'cube' and 'square-faced polyhedron' are intensionally the same [Putnam] |
14207 | If cats equal cherries, model theory allows reinterpretation of the whole language preserving truth [Putnam] |
14214 | If we try to cure the abundance of theories with causal links, this is 'just more theory' [Putnam, by Lewis] |
14205 | The sentence 'A cat is on a mat' remains always true when 'cat' means cherry and 'mat' means tree [Putnam] |
7610 | A fact is simply what it is rational to accept [Putnam] |
7618 | Very nominalistic philosophers deny properties, though scientists accept them [Putnam] |
15554 | A disposition needs a causal basis, a property in a certain causal role. Could the disposition be the property? [Lewis] |
12693 | A body is that which exists in space [Leibniz] |
4718 | If necessity is always relative to a description in a language, then there is only 'de dicto' necessity [Putnam, by O'Grady] |
15560 | We can explain a chance event, but can never show why some other outcome did not occur [Lewis] |
7620 | Some kind of objective 'rightness' is a presupposition of thought itself [Putnam] |
14204 | Naïve operationalism would have meanings change every time the tests change [Putnam] |
15559 | Does a good explanation produce understanding? That claim is just empty [Lewis] |
15556 | Science may well pursue generalised explanation, rather than laws [Lewis] |
15558 | A good explanation is supposed to show that the event had to happen [Lewis] |
4809 | Lewis endorses the thesis that all explanation of singular events is causal explanation [Lewis, by Psillos] |
14321 | To explain an event is to provide some information about its causal history [Lewis] |
7611 | Rationality is one part of our conception of human flourishing [Putnam] |
14200 | 'Water' on Twin Earth doesn't refer to water, but no mental difference can account for this [Putnam] |
7612 | Reference is social not individual, because we defer to experts when referring to elm trees [Putnam] |
7613 | Concepts are (at least in part) abilities and not occurrences [Putnam] |
14202 | Neither individual nor community mental states fix reference [Putnam] |
14201 | Maybe the total mental state of a language community fixes the reference of a term [Putnam] |
14206 | There are infinitely many interpretations of a sentence which can all seem to be 'correct' [Putnam] |
7624 | The word 'inconsiderate' nicely shows the blurring of facts and values [Putnam] |
15555 | Explaining match lighting in general is like explaining one lighting of a match [Lewis] |
15551 | Ways of carving causes may be natural, but never 'right' [Lewis] |
15552 | We only pick 'the' cause for the purposes of some particular enquiry. [Lewis] |
15553 | Causal dependence is counterfactual dependence between events [Lewis] |