Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Causal Explanation', 'Letters to Paul Pellison-Fontinier' and 'Causation and Laws of Nature'

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22 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 3. Analysis of Preconditions
14600 Analysis aims at secure necessary and sufficient conditions [Schaffer,J]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 1. Fallacy
14603 'Reification' occurs if we mistake a concept for a thing [Schaffer,J]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 6. Verisimilitude
15557 Verisimilitude has proved hard to analyse, and seems to have several components [Lewis]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / d. System T
14607 T adds □p→p for reflexivity, and is ideal for modeling lawhood [Schaffer,J]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / b. Indispensability of mathematics
14604 If a notion is ontologically basic, it should be needed in our best attempt at science [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
14599 Three types of reduction: Theoretical (of terms), Definitional (of concepts), Ontological (of reality) [Schaffer,J]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
14605 Tropes are the same as events [Schaffer,J]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
15554 A disposition needs a causal basis, a property in a certain causal role. Could the disposition be the property? [Lewis]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
14601 Individuation aims to count entities, by saying when there is one [Schaffer,J]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 7. Chance
15560 We can explain a chance event, but can never show why some other outcome did not occur [Lewis]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
14606 Only ideal conceivability could indicate what is possible [Schaffer,J]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
15559 Does a good explanation produce understanding? That claim is just empty [Lewis]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
15556 Science may well pursue generalised explanation, rather than laws [Lewis]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / f. Necessity in explanations
15558 A good explanation is supposed to show that the event had to happen [Lewis]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
4809 Lewis endorses the thesis that all explanation of singular events is causal explanation [Lewis, by Psillos]
14321 To explain an event is to provide some information about its causal history [Lewis]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
15555 Explaining match lighting in general is like explaining one lighting of a match [Lewis]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
15552 We only pick 'the' cause for the purposes of some particular enquiry. [Lewis]
15551 Ways of carving causes may be natural, but never 'right' [Lewis]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
15553 Causal dependence is counterfactual dependence between events [Lewis]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces
12719 Clearly, force is that from which action follows, when unimpeded [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / i. Denying time
12720 Time doesn't exist, since its parts don't coexist [Leibniz]