46 ideas
13395 | If an analysis shows the features of a concept, it doesn't seem to 'reduce' the concept [Jubien] |
13378 | It is a mistake to think that the logic developed for mathematics can clarify language and philosophy [Jubien] |
13402 | We only grasp a name if we know whether to apply it when the bearer changes [Jubien] |
13405 | The baptiser picks the bearer of a name, but social use decides the category [Jubien] |
13399 | Examples show that ordinary proper names are not rigid designators [Jubien] |
13398 | We could make a contingent description into a rigid and necessary one by adding 'actual' to it [Jubien] |
13392 | Philosophers reduce complex English kind-quantifiers to the simplistic first-order quantifier [Jubien] |
13404 | To exist necessarily is to have an essence whose own essence must be instantiated [Jubien] |
13386 | If objects are just conventional, there is no ontological distinction between stuff and things [Jubien] |
13403 | The category of Venus is not 'object', or even 'planet', but a particular class of good-sized object [Jubien] |
9476 | If dispositions are more fundamental than causes, then they won't conceptually reduce to them [Bird on Lewis] |
13375 | The idea that every entity must have identity conditions is an unfortunate misunderstanding [Jubien] |
13393 | Any entity has the unique property of being that specific entity [Jubien] |
13388 | It is incoherent to think that a given entity depends on its kind for its existence [Jubien] |
13384 | Objects need conventions for their matter, their temporal possibility, and their spatial possibility [Jubien] |
13385 | Basically, the world doesn't have ready-made 'objects'; we carve objects any way we like [Jubien] |
13383 | If the statue is loved and the clay hated, that is about the object first qua statue, then qua clay [Jubien] |
13400 | If one entity is an object, a statue, and some clay, these come apart in at least three ways [Jubien] |
13401 | The idea of coincident objects is a last resort, as it is opposed to commonsense naturalism [Jubien] |
13380 | Parts seem to matter when it is just an object, but not matter when it is a kind of object [Jubien] |
13376 | We should not regard essentialism as just nontrivial de re necessity [Jubien] |
13381 | Thinking of them as 'ships' the repaired ship is the original, but as 'objects' the reassembly is the original [Jubien] |
13382 | Rearranging the planks as a ship is confusing; we'd say it was the same 'object' with a different arrangement [Jubien] |
13379 | If two objects are indiscernible across spacetime, how could we decide whether or not they are the same? [Jubien] |
13394 | Entailment does not result from mutual necessity; mutual necessity ensures entailment [Jubien] |
8425 | For true counterfactuals, both antecedent and consequent true is closest to actuality [Lewis] |
13391 | Modality concerns relations among platonic properties [Jubien] |
13374 | To analyse modality, we must give accounts of objects, properties and relations [Jubien] |
13389 | The love of possible worlds is part of the dream that technical logic solves philosophical problems [Jubien] |
13390 | Possible worlds don't explain necessity, because they are a bunch of parallel contingencies [Jubien] |
8424 | Determinism says there can't be two identical worlds up to a time, with identical laws, which then differ [Lewis] |
13396 | Analysing mental concepts points to 'inclusionism' - that mental phenomena are part of the physical [Jubien] |
13377 | First-order logic tilts in favour of the direct reference theory, in its use of constants for objects [Jubien] |
8420 | A proposition is a set of possible worlds where it is true [Lewis] |
8405 | A theory of causation should explain why cause precedes effect, not take it for granted [Lewis, by Field,H] |
8427 | I reject making the direction of causation axiomatic, since that takes too much for granted [Lewis] |
10392 | It is just individious discrimination to pick out one cause and label it as 'the' cause [Lewis] |
8419 | The modern regularity view says a cause is a member of a minimal set of sufficient conditions [Lewis] |
8421 | Regularity analyses could make c an effect of e, or an epiphenomenon, or inefficacious, or pre-empted [Lewis] |
17525 | The counterfactual view says causes are necessary (rather than sufficient) for their effects [Lewis, by Bird] |
17524 | Lewis has basic causation, counterfactuals, and a general ancestral (thus handling pre-emption) [Lewis, by Bird] |
8397 | Counterfactual causation implies all laws are causal, which they aren't [Tooley on Lewis] |
8423 | My counterfactual analysis applies to particular cases, not generalisations [Lewis] |
8426 | One event causes another iff there is a causal chain from first to second [Lewis] |
4795 | Lewis's account of counterfactuals is fine if we know what a law of nature is, but it won't explain the latter [Cohen,LJ on Lewis] |
12709 | Motion is not absolute, but consists in relation [Leibniz] |