39 ideas
22317 | Truth does not admit of more and less [Frege] |
13455 | Frege did not think of himself as working with sets [Frege, by Hart,WD] |
16895 | The null set is indefensible, because it collects nothing [Frege, by Burge] |
3328 | Frege proposed a realist concept of a set, as the extension of a predicate or concept or function [Frege, by Benardete,JA] |
9179 | Frege frequently expressed a contempt for language [Frege, by Dummett] |
13473 | Frege thinks there is an independent logical order of the truths, which we must try to discover [Frege, by Hart,WD] |
10065 | Perhaps If-thenism survives in mathematics if we stick to first-order logic [Musgrave] |
10061 | The If-thenist view only seems to work for the axiomatised portions of mathematics [Musgrave] |
6076 | For Frege, predicates are names of functions that map objects onto the True and False [Frege, by McGinn] |
3319 | Frege gives a functional account of predication so that we can dispense with predicates [Frege, by Benardete,JA] |
9871 | Frege always, and fatally, neglected the domain of quantification [Dummett on Frege] |
10049 | Logical truths may contain non-logical notions, as in 'all men are men' [Musgrave] |
16884 | Basic truths of logic are not proved, but seen as true when they are understood [Frege, by Burge] |
10050 | A statement is logically true if it comes out true in all interpretations in all (non-empty) domains [Musgrave] |
14212 | A consistent theory just needs one model; isomorphic versions will do too, and large domains provide those [Lewis] |
10058 | No two numbers having the same successor relies on the Axiom of Infinity [Musgrave] |
3331 | If '5' is the set of all sets with five members, that may be circular, and you can know a priori if the set has content [Benardete,JA on Frege] |
16880 | Frege aimed to discover the logical foundations which justify arithmetical judgements [Frege, by Burge] |
8689 | Eventually Frege tried to found arithmetic in geometry instead of in logic [Frege, by Friend] |
10063 | Formalism is a bulwark of logical positivism [Musgrave] |
10062 | Formalism seems to exclude all creative, growing mathematics [Musgrave] |
5657 | Frege's logic showed that there is no concept of being [Frege, by Scruton] |
14213 | Anti-realists see the world as imaginary, or lacking joints, or beyond reference, or beyond truth [Lewis] |
14210 | A gerrymandered mereological sum can be a mess, but still have natural joints [Lewis] |
3318 | Frege made identity a logical notion, enshrined above all in the formula 'for all x, x=x' [Frege, by Benardete,JA] |
16885 | To understand a thought, understand its inferential connections to other thoughts [Frege, by Burge] |
16887 | Frege's concept of 'self-evident' makes no reference to minds [Frege, by Burge] |
16894 | An apriori truth is grounded in generality, which is universal quantification [Frege, by Burge] |
16882 | The building blocks contain the whole contents of a discipline [Frege] |
5816 | Frege said concepts were abstract entities, not mental entities [Frege, by Putnam] |
7307 | A thought is not psychological, but a condition of the world that makes a sentence true [Frege, by Miller,A] |
10060 | Logical positivists adopted an If-thenist version of logicism about numbers [Musgrave] |
14215 | Causal theories of reference make errors in reference easy [Lewis] |
14209 | Descriptive theories remain part of the theory of reference (with seven mild modifications) [Lewis] |
7309 | Frege's 'sense' is the strict and literal meaning, stripped of tone [Frege, by Miller,A] |
7312 | 'Sense' solves the problems of bearerless names, substitution in beliefs, and informativeness [Frege, by Miller,A] |
7725 | 'P or not-p' seems to be analytic, but does not fit Kant's account, lacking clear subject or predicate [Frege, by Weiner] |
7316 | Analytic truths are those that can be demonstrated using only logic and definitions [Frege, by Miller,A] |
3307 | Frege put forward an ontological argument for the existence of numbers [Frege, by Benardete,JA] |