Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Extrinsic Properties', 'Review of Husserl's 'Phil of Arithmetic'' and 'Does moral phil rest on a mistake?'

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23 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
9821 A definition need not capture the sense of an expression - just get the reference right [Frege, by Dummett]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / e. Axioms of PL
9585 Since every definition is an equation, one cannot define equality itself [Frege]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / e. Counting by correlation
17446 Counting rests on one-one correspondence, of numerals to objects [Frege]
9582 Husserl rests sameness of number on one-one correlation, forgetting the correlation with numbers themselves [Frege]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / c. Fregean numbers
9586 In a number-statement, something is predicated of a concept [Frege]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
9580 Our concepts recognise existing relations, they don't change them [Frege]
9589 Numbers are not real like the sea, but (crucially) they are still objective [Frege]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
9577 The naïve view of number is that it is like a heap of things, or maybe a property of a heap [Frege]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / b. Levels of abstraction
9578 If objects are just presentation, we get increasing abstraction by ignoring their properties [Frege]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 4. Intrinsic Properties
14979 Being alone doesn't guarantee intrinsic properties; 'being alone' is itself extrinsic [Lewis, by Sider]
15454 Extrinsic properties come in degrees, with 'brother' less extrinsic than 'sibling' [Lewis]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / b. Individuation by properties
15455 Total intrinsic properties give us what a thing is [Lewis]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
9581 Many people have the same thought, which is the component, not the private presentation [Frege]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring
9579 Disregarding properties of two cats still leaves different objects, but what is now the difference? [Frege]
9587 How do you find the right level of inattention; you eliminate too many or too few characteristics [Frege]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 8. Abstractionism Critique
9588 Number-abstraction somehow makes things identical without changing them! [Frege]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
9583 Psychological logicians are concerned with sense of words, but mathematicians study the reference [Frege]
9584 Identity baffles psychologists, since A and B must be presented differently to identify them [Frege]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / c. Purpose of ethics
9261 The 'Ethics' is disappointing, because it fails to try to justify our duties [Prichard]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / c. Particularism
9262 The mistake is to think we can prove what can only be seen directly in moral thinking [Prichard]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique
9260 Virtues won't generate an obligation, so it isn't a basis for morality [Prichard]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
9259 We feel obligations to overcome our own failings, and these are not relations to other people [Prichard]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
9258 If pain were instrinsically wrong, it would be immoral to inflict it on ourselves [Prichard]