Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Against Structural Universals', 'The Structure of Paradoxes of Self-Reference' and 'On Aristotle's Metaphysics Book 2'

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26 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 1. Paradox
Typically, paradoxes are dealt with by dividing them into two groups, but the division is wrong [Priest,G]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / b. König's paradox
The 'least indefinable ordinal' is defined by that very phrase [Priest,G]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / c. Berry's paradox
'x is a natural number definable in less than 19 words' leads to contradiction [Priest,G]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / d. Richard's paradox
By diagonalization we can define a real number that isn't in the definable set of reals [Priest,G]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / c. Burali-Forti's paradox
The least ordinal greater than the set of all ordinals is both one of them and not one of them [Priest,G]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / e. Mirimanoff's paradox
The next set up in the hierarchy of sets seems to be both a member and not a member of it [Priest,G]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
If you know that a sentence is not one of the known sentences, you know its truth [Priest,G]
There are Liar Pairs, and Liar Chains, which fit the same pattern as the basic Liar [Priest,G]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 4. Intrinsic Properties
If you think universals are immanent, you must believe them to be sparse, and not every related predicate [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
I assume there could be natural properties that are not instantiated in our world [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
Tropes are particular properties, which cannot recur, but can be exact duplicates [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
Universals are meant to give an account of resemblance [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
We can add a primitive natural/unnatural distinction to class nominalism [Lewis]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 1. Structure of an Object
The 'magical' view of structural universals says they are atoms, even though they have parts [Lewis]
If 'methane' is an atomic structural universal, it has nothing to connect it to its carbon universals [Lewis]
The 'pictorial' view of structural universals says they are wholes made of universals as parts [Lewis]
The structural universal 'methane' needs the universal 'hydrogen' four times over [Lewis]
Butane and Isobutane have the same atoms, but different structures [Lewis]
Structural universals have a necessary connection to the universals forming its parts [Lewis]
We can't get rid of structural universals if there are no simple universals [Lewis]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
Composition is not just making new things from old; there are too many counterexamples [Lewis]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
A whole is distinct from its parts, but is not a further addition in ontology [Lewis]
Different things (a toy house and toy car) can be made of the same parts at different times [Lewis]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
Maybe abstraction is just mereological subtraction [Lewis]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
Mathematicians abstract by equivalence classes, but that doesn't turn a many into one [Lewis]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
How can things without weight compose weight? [Alexander]