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All the ideas for 'Causal Explanation', 'Identity' and 'Humean metaphysics vs metaphysics of Powers'

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22 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 6. Verisimilitude
Verisimilitude has proved hard to analyse, and seems to have several components [Lewis]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
It is controversial whether only 'numerical identity' allows two things to be counted as one [Noonan]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
A disposition needs a causal basis, a property in a certain causal role. Could the disposition be the property? [Lewis]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
I could have died at five, but the summation of my adult stages could not [Noonan]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
Stage theorists accept four-dimensionalism, but call each stage a whole object [Noonan]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 2. Defining Identity
Problems about identity can't even be formulated without the concept of identity [Noonan]
Identity is usually defined as the equivalence relation satisfying Leibniz's Law [Noonan]
Identity definitions (such as self-identity, or the smallest equivalence relation) are usually circular [Noonan]
Identity can only be characterised in a second-order language [Noonan]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
Indiscernibility is basic to our understanding of identity and distinctness [Noonan]
Leibniz's Law must be kept separate from the substitutivity principle [Noonan]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 7. Chance
We can explain a chance event, but can never show why some other outcome did not occur [Lewis]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
Does a good explanation produce understanding? That claim is just empty [Lewis]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
Science may well pursue generalised explanation, rather than laws [Lewis]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / f. Necessity in explanations
A good explanation is supposed to show that the event had to happen [Lewis]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
Lewis endorses the thesis that all explanation of singular events is causal explanation [Lewis, by Psillos]
To explain an event is to provide some information about its causal history [Lewis]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
Explaining match lighting in general is like explaining one lighting of a match [Lewis]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
Ways of carving causes may be natural, but never 'right' [Lewis]
We only pick 'the' cause for the purposes of some particular enquiry. [Lewis]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
Causal dependence is counterfactual dependence between events [Lewis]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / g. Time's arrow
Causation is the power of one property to produce another, and this gives time its direction [Esfeld]