12 ideas
| 8226 | A well-posed problem is a problem solved [Bergson, by Deleuze/Guattari] |
| 22664 | I do not care if my trivial beliefs are false, and I have no interest in many truths [Nozick] |
| 22665 | Maybe James was depicting the value of truth, and not its nature [Nozick] |
| 18415 | The actual world is just the world you are in [Lewis, by Cappelen/Dever] |
| 16392 | A content is a property, and believing it is self-ascribing that property [Lewis, by Recanati] |
| 18416 | Attitudes involve properties (not propositions), and belief is self-ascribing the properties [Lewis, by Solomon] |
| 22662 | In the instrumental view of rationality it only concerns means, and not ends [Nozick] |
| 22666 | Is it rational to believe a truth which leads to permanent misery? [Nozick] |
| 22667 | Rationality needs some self-consciousness, to also evaluate how we acquired our reasons [Nozick] |
| 22663 | Rationality is normally said to concern either giving reasons, or reliability [Nozick] |
| 16390 | Lewis's popular centred worlds approach gives an attitude an index of world, subject and time [Lewis, by Recanati] |
| 18418 | A theory of perspectival de se content gives truth conditions relative to an agent [Lewis, by Cappelen/Dever] |