33 ideas
| 3972 | Truth and objectivity depend on a community of speakers to interpret what they mean [Davidson] |
| 3969 | There are no ultimate standards of rationality, since we only assess others by our own standard [Davidson] |
| 15435 | If you think universals are immanent, you must believe them to be sparse, and not every related predicate [Lewis] |
| 15451 | I assume there could be natural properties that are not instantiated in our world [Lewis] |
| 15433 | Tropes are particular properties, which cannot recur, but can be exact duplicates [Lewis] |
| 15436 | Universals are meant to give an account of resemblance [Lewis] |
| 15438 | We can add a primitive natural/unnatural distinction to class nominalism [Lewis] |
| 15448 | The 'magical' view of structural universals says they are atoms, even though they have parts [Lewis] |
| 15449 | If 'methane' is an atomic structural universal, it has nothing to connect it to its carbon universals [Lewis] |
| 15439 | The 'pictorial' view of structural universals says they are wholes made of universals as parts [Lewis] |
| 15441 | The structural universal 'methane' needs the universal 'hydrogen' four times over [Lewis] |
| 15445 | Butane and Isobutane have the same atoms, but different structures [Lewis] |
| 15434 | Structural universals have a necessary connection to the universals forming its parts [Lewis] |
| 15437 | We can't get rid of structural universals if there are no simple universals [Lewis] |
| 15446 | Composition is not just making new things from old; there are too many counterexamples [Lewis] |
| 15440 | A whole is distinct from its parts, but is not a further addition in ontology [Lewis] |
| 15444 | Different things (a toy house and toy car) can be made of the same parts at different times [Lewis] |
| 4254 | Externalist accounts of knowledge do not require the traditional sort of justification [Kornblith] |
| 3960 | There are no such things as minds, but people have mental properties [Davidson] |
| 15450 | Maybe abstraction is just mereological subtraction [Lewis] |
| 3964 | If the mind is an anomaly, this makes reduction of the mental to the physical impossible [Davidson] |
| 3961 | Obviously all mental events are causally related to physical events [Davidson] |
| 3963 | There are no strict psychophysical laws connecting mental and physical events [Davidson] |
| 3965 | Mental entities do not add to the physical furniture of the world [Davidson] |
| 3966 | The correct conclusion is ontological monism combined with conceptual dualism [Davidson] |
| 3967 | Absence of all rationality would be absence of thought [Davidson] |
| 3974 | Our meanings are partly fixed by events of which we may be ignorant [Davidson] |
| 15443 | Mathematicians abstract by equivalence classes, but that doesn't turn a many into one [Lewis] |
| 3968 | Propositions explain nothing without an explanation of how sentences manage to name them [Davidson] |
| 3970 | Thought is only fully developed if we communicate with others [Davidson] |
| 3971 | There is simply no alternative to the 'principle of charity' in interpreting what others do [Davidson] |
| 3973 | Without a teacher, the concept of 'getting things right or wrong' is meaningless [Davidson] |
| 3962 | Cause and effect relations between events must follow strict laws [Davidson] |