20 ideas
15545 | Armstrong's analysis seeks truthmakers rather than definitions [Lewis] |
15546 | Predications aren't true because of what exists, but of how it exists [Lewis] |
15548 | Say 'truth is supervenient on being', but construe 'being' broadly [Lewis] |
14399 | Presentism says only the present exists, so there is nothing for tensed truths to supervene on [Lewis] |
18951 | For scientific purposes there is a precise concept of 'true-in-L', using set theory [Putnam] |
18953 | Modern notation frees us from Aristotle's restriction of only using two class-names in premises [Putnam] |
18949 | The universal syllogism is now expressed as the transitivity of subclasses [Putnam] |
18952 | '⊃' ('if...then') is used with the definition 'Px ⊃ Qx' is short for '¬(Px & ¬Qx)' [Putnam] |
18958 | In type theory, 'x ∈ y' is well defined only if x and y are of the appropriate type [Putnam] |
18954 | Before the late 19th century logic was trivialised by not dealing with relations [Putnam] |
18956 | Asserting first-order validity implicitly involves second-order reference to classes [Putnam] |
18962 | Unfashionably, I think logic has an empirical foundation [Putnam] |
18961 | We can identify functions with certain sets - or identify sets with certain functions [Putnam] |
18955 | Having a valid form doesn't ensure truth, as it may be meaningless [Putnam] |
18959 | Sets larger than the continuum should be studied in an 'if-then' spirit [Putnam] |
18201 | General principles can be obvious in mathematics, but bold speculations in empirical science [Parsons,C] |
15543 | How do things combine to make states of affairs? Constituents can repeat, and fail to combine [Lewis] |
18957 | Nominalism only makes sense if it is materialist [Putnam] |
18950 | Physics is full of non-physical entities, such as space-vectors [Putnam] |
18960 | Most predictions are uninteresting, and are only sought in order to confirm a theory [Putnam] |