14 ideas
| 9169 | A statement can be metaphysically necessary and epistemologically contingent [Putnam] |
| 5819 | Conceivability is no proof of possibility [Putnam] |
| 18415 | The actual world is just the world you are in [Lewis, by Cappelen/Dever] |
| 16392 | A content is a property, and believing it is self-ascribing that property [Lewis, by Recanati] |
| 18416 | Attitudes involve properties (not propositions), and belief is self-ascribing the properties [Lewis, by Solomon] |
| 16390 | Lewis's popular centred worlds approach gives an attitude an index of world, subject and time [Lewis, by Recanati] |
| 9168 | I can't distinguish elm trees, but I mean by 'elm' the same set of trees as everybody else [Putnam] |
| 5820 | 'Water' has an unnoticed indexical component, referring to stuff around here [Putnam] |
| 18418 | A theory of perspectival de se content gives truth conditions relative to an agent [Lewis, by Cappelen/Dever] |
| 9170 | We need to recognise the contribution of society and of the world in determining reference [Putnam] |
| 18052 | An assertion aims to add to the content of a context [Stalnaker, by Magidor] |
| 5817 | Language is more like a cooperative steamship than an individual hammer [Putnam] |
| 14718 | An assertion is an attempt to rule out certain possibilities, narrowing things down for good planning [Stalnaker, by Schroeter] |
| 5818 | If water is H2O in the actual world, there is no possible world where it isn't H2O [Putnam] |