Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Extrinsic Properties', 'Concepts and Counting' and 'Philosophical Insignificance of A Priori Knowledge'

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10 ideas

1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
13407 All worthwhile philosophy is synthetic theorizing, evaluated by experience [Papineau]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
17462 A single object must not be counted twice, which needs knowledge of distinctness (negative identity) [Rumfitt]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / c. Fregean numbers
17461 Some 'how many?' answers are not predications of a concept, like 'how many gallons?' [Rumfitt]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
13409 Our best theories may commit us to mathematical abstracta, but that doesn't justify the commitment [Papineau]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 4. Intrinsic Properties
14979 Being alone doesn't guarantee intrinsic properties; 'being alone' is itself extrinsic [Lewis, by Sider]
15454 Extrinsic properties come in degrees, with 'brother' less extrinsic than 'sibling' [Lewis]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / b. Individuation by properties
15455 Total intrinsic properties give us what a thing is [Lewis]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
13406 A priori knowledge is analytic - the structure of our concepts - and hence unimportant [Papineau]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
13408 Intuition and thought-experiments embody substantial information about the world [Papineau]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
13410 Verificationism about concepts means you can't deny a theory, because you can't have the concept [Papineau]