63 ideas
18835 | Logic doesn't have a metaphysical basis, but nor can logic give rise to the metaphysics [Rumfitt] |
9023 | If you say that a contradiction is true, you change the meaning of 'not', and so change the subject [Quine] |
18819 | The idea that there are unrecognised truths is basic to our concept of truth [Rumfitt] |
18826 | 'True at a possibility' means necessarily true if what is said had obtained [Rumfitt] |
9012 | Talk of 'truth' when sentences are mentioned; it reminds us that reality is the point of sentences [Quine] |
9011 | Truth is redundant for single sentences; we do better to simply speak the sentence [Quine] |
18803 | Semantics for propositions: 1) validity preserves truth 2) non-contradition 3) bivalence 4) truth tables [Rumfitt] |
9013 | We can eliminate 'or' from our basic theory, by paraphrasing 'p or q' as 'not(not-p and not-q)' [Quine] |
18814 | 'Absolute necessity' would have to rest on S5 [Rumfitt] |
18798 | It is the second-order part of intuitionistic logic which actually negates some classical theorems [Rumfitt] |
18799 | Intuitionists can accept Double Negation Elimination for decidable propositions [Rumfitt] |
18830 | Most set theorists doubt bivalence for the Continuum Hypothesis, but still use classical logic [Rumfitt] |
18843 | The iterated conception of set requires continual increase in axiom strength [Rumfitt] |
18836 | A set may well not consist of its members; the empty set, for example, is a problem [Rumfitt] |
18837 | A set can be determinate, because of its concept, and still have vague membership [Rumfitt] |
18845 | If the totality of sets is not well-defined, there must be doubt about the Power Set Axiom [Rumfitt] |
9020 | My logical grammar has sentences by predication, then negation, conjunction, and existential quantification [Quine] |
18815 | Logic is higher-order laws which can expand the range of any sort of deduction [Rumfitt] |
9028 | Maybe logical truth reflects reality, but in different ways in different languages [Quine] |
18804 | The case for classical logic rests on its rules, much more than on the Principle of Bivalence [Rumfitt] |
18805 | Classical logic rules cannot be proved, but various lines of attack can be repelled [Rumfitt] |
18827 | If truth-tables specify the connectives, classical logic must rely on Bivalence [Rumfitt] |
10014 | Quine rejects second-order logic, saying that predicates refer to multiple objects [Quine, by Hodes] |
10828 | Quantifying over predicates is treating them as names of entities [Quine] |
18813 | Logical consequence is a relation that can extended into further statements [Rumfitt] |
18808 | Normal deduction presupposes the Cut Law [Rumfitt] |
18840 | When faced with vague statements, Bivalence is not a compelling principle [Rumfitt] |
9024 | Excluded middle has three different definitions [Quine] |
10012 | Quantification theory can still be proved complete if we add identity [Quine] |
18802 | In specifying a logical constant, use of that constant is quite unavoidable [Rumfitt] |
9016 | Names are not essential, because naming can be turned into predication [Quine] |
9015 | Universal quantification is widespread, but it is definable in terms of existential quantification [Quine] |
9025 | You can't base quantification on substituting names for variables, if the irrationals cannot all be named [Quine] |
9026 | Some quantifications could be false substitutionally and true objectually, because of nameless objects [Quine] |
10705 | Putting a predicate letter in a quantifier is to make it the name of an entity [Quine] |
18800 | Introduction rules give deduction conditions, and Elimination says what can be deduced [Rumfitt] |
18809 | Logical truths are just the assumption-free by-products of logical rules [Rumfitt] |
9027 | A sentence is logically true if all sentences with that grammatical structure are true [Quine] |
18807 | Monotonicity means there is a guarantee, rather than mere inductive support [Rumfitt] |
18842 | Maybe an ordinal is a property of isomorphic well-ordered sets, and not itself a set [Rumfitt] |
18834 | Infinitesimals do not stand in a determinate order relation to zero [Rumfitt] |
18846 | Cantor and Dedekind aimed to give analysis a foundation in set theory (rather than geometry) [Rumfitt] |
9017 | Predicates are not names; predicates are the other parties to predication [Quine] |
9018 | A physical object is the four-dimensional material content of a portion of space-time [Quine] |
18839 | An object that is not clearly red or orange can still be red-or-orange, which sweeps up problem cases [Rumfitt] |
18838 | The extension of a colour is decided by a concept's place in a network of contraries [Rumfitt] |
9019 | Four-d objects helps predication of what no longer exists, and quantification over items from different times [Quine] |
18816 | Metaphysical modalities respect the actual identities of things [Rumfitt] |
18825 | S5 is the logic of logical necessity [Rumfitt] |
18824 | Since possibilities are properties of the world, calling 'red' the determination of a determinable seems right [Rumfitt] |
18828 | If two possibilities can't share a determiner, they are incompatible [Rumfitt] |
9014 | Some conditionals can be explained just by negation and conjunction: not(p and not-q) [Quine] |
18821 | Possibilities are like possible worlds, but not fully determinate or complete [Rumfitt] |
18831 | Medieval logicians said understanding A also involved understanding not-A [Rumfitt] |
18820 | In English 'evidence' is a mass term, qualified by 'little' and 'more' [Rumfitt] |
18817 | We understand conditionals, but disagree over their truth-conditions [Rumfitt] |
9009 | Single words are strongly synonymous if their interchange preserves truth [Quine] |
9007 | It makes no sense to say that two sentences express the same proposition [Quine] |
9008 | There is no rule for separating the information from other features of sentences [Quine] |
9010 | We can abandon propositions, and just talk of sentences and equivalence [Quine] |
18829 | The truth grounds for 'not A' are the possibilities incompatible with truth grounds for A [Rumfitt] |
9021 | A good way of explaining an expression is saying what conditions make its contexts true [Quine] |
9425 | Lewis later proposed the axioms at the intersection of the best theories (which may be few) [Mumford on Lewis] |