19 ideas
| 6859 | Analytic philosophy has much higher standards of thinking than continental philosophy [Williamson] |
| 15557 | Verisimilitude has proved hard to analyse, and seems to have several components [Lewis] |
| 6862 | Fuzzy logic uses a continuum of truth, but it implies contradictions [Williamson] |
| 6858 | Formal logic struck me as exactly the language I wanted to think in [Williamson] |
| 6863 | Close to conceptual boundaries judgement is too unreliable to give knowledge [Williamson] |
| 15554 | A disposition needs a causal basis, a property in a certain causal role. Could the disposition be the property? [Lewis] |
| 6861 | What sort of logic is needed for vague concepts, and what sort of concept of truth? [Williamson] |
| 15560 | We can explain a chance event, but can never show why some other outcome did not occur [Lewis] |
| 6860 | How can one discriminate yellow from red, but not the colours in between? [Williamson] |
| 15559 | Does a good explanation produce understanding? That claim is just empty [Lewis] |
| 15556 | Science may well pursue generalised explanation, rather than laws [Lewis] |
| 15558 | A good explanation is supposed to show that the event had to happen [Lewis] |
| 4809 | Lewis endorses the thesis that all explanation of singular events is causal explanation [Lewis, by Psillos] |
| 14321 | To explain an event is to provide some information about its causal history [Lewis] |
| 5271 | Prejudice apart, push-pin has equal value with music and poetry [Bentham] |
| 15555 | Explaining match lighting in general is like explaining one lighting of a match [Lewis] |
| 15551 | Ways of carving causes may be natural, but never 'right' [Lewis] |
| 15552 | We only pick 'the' cause for the purposes of some particular enquiry. [Lewis] |
| 15553 | Causal dependence is counterfactual dependence between events [Lewis] |