46 ideas
| 3005 | 'Jocasta' needs to be distinguished from 'Oedipus's mother' because they are connected by different properties [Fodor] |
| 17867 | If a concept is not compact, it will not be presentable to finite minds [Almog] |
| 17877 | The number series is primitive, not the result of some set theoretic axioms [Almog] |
| 7014 | A particle and a coin heads-or-tails pick out to perfectly well-defined predicates and properties [Fodor] |
| 11976 | Aristotelian essentialism says essences are not relative to specification [Lewis] |
| 17872 | Definitionalists rely on snapshot-concepts, instead of on the real processes [Almog] |
| 17871 | Fregean meanings are analogous to conceptual essence, defining a kind [Almog] |
| 17866 | Essential definition aims at existence conditions and structural truths [Almog] |
| 17868 | Surface accounts aren't exhaustive as they always allow unintended twin cases [Almog] |
| 17870 | Alien 'tigers' can't be tigers if they are not related to our tigers [Almog] |
| 17869 | Kripke and Putnam offer an intermediary between real and nominal essences [Almog] |
| 17876 | Individual essences are just cobbled together classificatory predicates [Almog] |
| 11978 | Causal necessities hold in all worlds compatible with the laws of nature [Lewis] |
| 11979 | It doesn't take the whole of a possible Humphrey to win the election [Lewis] |
| 16994 | Counterpart theory is bizarre, as no one cares what happens to a mere counterpart [Kripke on Lewis] |
| 11974 | Counterparts are not the original thing, but resemble it more than other things do [Lewis] |
| 11975 | If the closest resembler to you is in fact quite unlike you, then you have no counterpart [Lewis] |
| 11977 | Essential attributes are those shared with all the counterparts [Lewis] |
| 3008 | Evolution suggests that innate knowledge of human psychology would be beneficial [Fodor] |
| 2990 | Contrary to commonsense, most of what is in the mind seems to be unlearned [Fodor] |
| 3009 | Sticklebacks have an innate idea that red things are rivals [Fodor] |
| 2994 | In CRTT thought may be represented, content must be [Fodor] |
| 15494 | We can't use propositions to explain intentional attitudes, because they would need explaining [Fodor] |
| 7326 | Intentionality doesn't go deep enough to appear on the physicists' ultimate list of things [Fodor] |
| 3001 | Behaviourism has no theory of mental causation [Fodor] |
| 2993 | Any piece of software can always be hard-wired [Fodor] |
| 3011 | Causal powers must be a crucial feature of mental states [Fodor] |
| 5498 | Mind is a set of hierarchical 'homunculi', which are made up in turn from subcomponents [Fodor, by Lycan] |
| 2995 | Supervenience gives good support for mental causation [Fodor] |
| 2991 | Hume's associationism offers no explanation at all of rational thought [Fodor] |
| 3002 | If mind is just physical, how can it follow the rules required for intelligent thought? [Fodor] |
| 2992 | We may be able to explain rationality mechanically [Fodor] |
| 2988 | Folk psychology is the only explanation of behaviour we have [Fodor] |
| 3010 | Belief and desire are structured states, which need mentalese [Fodor] |
| 17873 | Water must be related to water, just as tigers must be related to tigers [Almog] |
| 2999 | Obsession with narrow content leads to various sorts of hopeless anti-realism [Fodor] |
| 3012 | Do identical thoughts have identical causal roles? [Fodor] |
| 2998 | Grice thinks meaning is inherited from the propositional attitudes which sentences express [Fodor] |
| 3006 | Whatever in the mind delivers falsehood is parasitic on what delivers truth [Fodor] |
| 3007 | Many different verification procedures can reach 'star', but it only has one semantic value [Fodor] |
| 3004 | The meaning of a sentence derives from its use in expressing an attitude [Fodor] |
| 3000 | Meaning holism is a crazy doctrine [Fodor] |
| 3003 | Very different mental states can share their contents, so content doesn't seem to be constructed from functional role [Fodor] |
| 2996 | Mental states may have the same content but different extensions [Fodor] |
| 17864 | Defining an essence comes no where near giving a thing's nature [Almog] |
| 17863 | Essences promise to reveal reality, but actually drive us away from it [Almog] |