Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Putnam's Paradox', 'Aristotle on Essence and Explanation' and 'fragments/reports'

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11 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
23367 Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 2. Isomorphisms
14212 A consistent theory just needs one model; isomorphic versions will do too, and large domains provide those [Lewis]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
14213 Anti-realists see the world as imaginary, or lacking joints, or beyond reference, or beyond truth [Lewis]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
14210 A gerrymandered mereological sum can be a mess, but still have natural joints [Lewis]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
11993 Jones may cease to exist without some simple property, but that doesn't make it essential [Kung]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / c. Essentials are necessary
11997 A property may belong essentially to one thing and contingently to another [Kung]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
11992 Aristotelian essences underlie a thing's existence, explain it, and must belong to it [Kung]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
11995 Some peripheral properties are explained by essential ones, but don't themselves explain properties [Kung]
11996 Some non-essential properties may explain more than essential-but-peripheral ones do [Kung]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
14215 Causal theories of reference make errors in reference easy [Lewis]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
14209 Descriptive theories remain part of the theory of reference (with seven mild modifications) [Lewis]