15 ideas
15127 | A categorical basis could hardly explain a disposition if it had no powers of its own [Hawthorne] |
15123 | Is the causal profile of a property its essence? [Hawthorne] |
15122 | Could two different properties have the same causal profile? [Hawthorne] |
15124 | If properties are more than their powers, we could have two properties with the same power [Hawthorne] |
15128 | We can treat the structure/form of the world differently from the nodes/matter of the world [Hawthorne] |
15121 | An individual essence is a necessary and sufficient profile for a thing [Hawthorne] |
18415 | The actual world is just the world you are in [Lewis, by Cappelen/Dever] |
16392 | A content is a property, and believing it is self-ascribing that property [Lewis, by Recanati] |
18416 | Attitudes involve properties (not propositions), and belief is self-ascribing the properties [Lewis, by Solomon] |
16390 | Lewis's popular centred worlds approach gives an attitude an index of world, subject and time [Lewis, by Recanati] |
2605 | If everything uses mentalese, ALL concepts must be innate! [Putnam] |
2606 | No machine language can express generalisations [Putnam] |
18418 | A theory of perspectival de se content gives truth conditions relative to an agent [Lewis, by Cappelen/Dever] |
15126 | Maybe scientific causation is just generalisation about the patterns [Hawthorne] |
15125 | We only know the mathematical laws, but not much else [Hawthorne] |