31 ideas
| 5893 | A wise man has integrity, firmness of will, nobility, consistency, sobriety, patience [Cicero] |
| 5891 | Philosophy is the collection of rational arguments [Cicero] |
| 10185 | Set theory is the standard background for modern mathematics [Burgess] |
| 10184 | Structuralists take the name 'R' of the reals to be a variable ranging over structures, not a structure [Burgess] |
| 10189 | There is no one relation for the real number 2, as relations differ in different models [Burgess] |
| 10186 | If set theory is used to define 'structure', we can't define set theory structurally [Burgess] |
| 10187 | Abstract algebra concerns relations between models, not common features of all the models [Burgess] |
| 10188 | How can mathematical relations be either internal, or external, or intrinsic? [Burgess] |
| 9476 | If dispositions are more fundamental than causes, then they won't conceptually reduce to them [Bird on Lewis] |
| 8425 | For true counterfactuals, both antecedent and consequent true is closest to actuality [Lewis] |
| 5879 | The soul is the heart, or blood in the heart, or part of the brain, of something living in heart or brain, or breath [Cicero] |
| 5884 | How can one mind perceive so many dissimilar sensations? [Cicero] |
| 5887 | The soul has a single nature, so it cannot be divided, and hence it cannot perish [Cicero] |
| 5886 | Like the eye, the soul has no power to see itself, but sees other things [Cicero] |
| 8424 | Determinism says there can't be two identical worlds up to a time, with identical laws, which then differ [Lewis] |
| 5885 | Souls contain no properties of elements, and elements contain no properties of souls [Cicero] |
| 8420 | A proposition is a set of possible worlds where it is true [Lewis] |
| 5890 | We should not share the distress of others, but simply try to relieve it [Cicero] |
| 5894 | All men except philosophers fear poverty [Cicero] |
| 5895 | If one despises illiterate mechanics individually, they are not worth more collectively [Cicero] |
| 8405 | A theory of causation should explain why cause precedes effect, not take it for granted [Lewis, by Field,H] |
| 8427 | I reject making the direction of causation axiomatic, since that takes too much for granted [Lewis] |
| 10392 | It is just individious discrimination to pick out one cause and label it as 'the' cause [Lewis] |
| 8419 | The modern regularity view says a cause is a member of a minimal set of sufficient conditions [Lewis] |
| 8421 | Regularity analyses could make c an effect of e, or an epiphenomenon, or inefficacious, or pre-empted [Lewis] |
| 17525 | The counterfactual view says causes are necessary (rather than sufficient) for their effects [Lewis, by Bird] |
| 17524 | Lewis has basic causation, counterfactuals, and a general ancestral (thus handling pre-emption) [Lewis, by Bird] |
| 8397 | Counterfactual causation implies all laws are causal, which they aren't [Tooley on Lewis] |
| 8423 | My counterfactual analysis applies to particular cases, not generalisations [Lewis] |
| 8426 | One event causes another iff there is a causal chain from first to second [Lewis] |
| 4795 | Lewis's account of counterfactuals is fine if we know what a law of nature is, but it won't explain the latter [Cohen,LJ on Lewis] |