15 ideas
15533 | We can quantify over fictions by quantifying for real over their names [Lewis] |
15534 | We could quantify over impossible objects - as bundles of properties [Lewis] |
14212 | A consistent theory just needs one model; isomorphic versions will do too, and large domains provide those [Lewis] |
15532 | 'Allists' embrace the existence of all controversial entities; 'noneists' reject all but the obvious ones [Lewis] |
15535 | We can't accept a use of 'existence' that says only some of the things there are actually exist [Lewis] |
14213 | Anti-realists see the world as imaginary, or lacking joints, or beyond reference, or beyond truth [Lewis] |
14210 | A gerrymandered mereological sum can be a mess, but still have natural joints [Lewis] |
14215 | Causal theories of reference make errors in reference easy [Lewis] |
14209 | Descriptive theories remain part of the theory of reference (with seven mild modifications) [Lewis] |
3785 | You can't separate acts from the people performing them [Glover] |
3786 | Aggression in defence may be beneficial but morally corrupting [Glover] |
3784 | Duty prohibits some acts, whatever their consequences [Glover] |
3782 | Satisfaction of desires is not at all the same as achieving happiness [Glover, by PG] |
3787 | Rule-utilitarianism is either act-utilitarianism, or not really utilitarian [Glover] |
3783 | How can utilitarianism decide the ideal population size? [Glover] |