Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Causal Explanation', 'Introductions to Utilitarianism and its Critics' and 'Freedom of the Will and concept of a person'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

25 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 6. Verisimilitude
15557 Verisimilitude has proved hard to analyse, and seems to have several components [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
15554 A disposition needs a causal basis, a property in a certain causal role. Could the disposition be the property? [Lewis]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 7. Chance
15560 We can explain a chance event, but can never show why some other outcome did not occur [Lewis]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
15559 Does a good explanation produce understanding? That claim is just empty [Lewis]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
15556 Science may well pursue generalised explanation, rather than laws [Lewis]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / f. Necessity in explanations
15558 A good explanation is supposed to show that the event had to happen [Lewis]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
4809 Lewis endorses the thesis that all explanation of singular events is causal explanation [Lewis, by Psillos]
14321 To explain an event is to provide some information about its causal history [Lewis]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 6. Self as Higher Awareness
9264 Persons are distinguished by a capacity for second-order desires [Frankfurt]
9266 A person essentially has second-order volitions, and not just second-order desires [Frankfurt]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
9267 Free will is the capacity to choose what sort of will you have [Frankfurt]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
9265 The will is the effective desire which actually leads to an action [Frankfurt]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / c. Agent causation
20015 Freedom of action needs the agent to identify with their reason for acting [Frankfurt, by Wilson/Schpall]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
9270 A 'wanton' is not a person, because they lack second-order volitions [Frankfurt]
9269 A person may be morally responsible without free will [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
3785 You can't separate acts from the people performing them [Glover]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / h. Good as benefit
3786 Aggression in defence may be beneficial but morally corrupting [Glover]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
3784 Duty prohibits some acts, whatever their consequences [Glover]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
3782 Satisfaction of desires is not at all the same as achieving happiness [Glover, by PG]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 5. Rule Utilitarianism
3787 Rule-utilitarianism is either act-utilitarianism, or not really utilitarian [Glover]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 2. Population / a. Human population
3783 How can utilitarianism decide the ideal population size? [Glover]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
15555 Explaining match lighting in general is like explaining one lighting of a match [Lewis]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
15551 Ways of carving causes may be natural, but never 'right' [Lewis]
15552 We only pick 'the' cause for the purposes of some particular enquiry. [Lewis]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
15553 Causal dependence is counterfactual dependence between events [Lewis]