13 ideas
14212 | A consistent theory just needs one model; isomorphic versions will do too, and large domains provide those [Lewis] |
14213 | Anti-realists see the world as imaginary, or lacking joints, or beyond reference, or beyond truth [Lewis] |
14210 | A gerrymandered mereological sum can be a mess, but still have natural joints [Lewis] |
2986 | Belief is the most important propositional attitude [Lyons] |
19679 | 'Access' internalism says responsibility needs access; weaker 'mentalism' needs mental justification [Kvanvig] |
19678 | Strong foundationalism needs strict inferences; weak version has induction, explanation, probability [Kvanvig] |
2978 | Consciousness no longer seems essential to intentionality [Lyons] |
2984 | Perceptions could give us information without symbolic representation [Lyons] |
2979 | Propositional attitudes require representation [Lyons] |
2987 | Folk psychology works badly for alien cultures [Lyons] |
2977 | All thinking has content [Lyons] |
14215 | Causal theories of reference make errors in reference easy [Lewis] |
14209 | Descriptive theories remain part of the theory of reference (with seven mild modifications) [Lewis] |