Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Causation', 'Toward a Philosophy of History' and 'Substance and Essence in Aristotle'

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23 ideas

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / h. Dasein (being human)
20752 For man, being is not what he is, but what he is going to be [Ortega y Gassett]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
9476 If dispositions are more fundamental than causes, then they won't conceptually reduce to them [Bird on Lewis]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
12066 Aristotelian and Kripkean essentialism are very different theories [Witt]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
12067 An Aristotelian essence is a nonlinguistic correlate of the definition [Witt]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
12082 If unity is a matter of degree, then essence may also be a matter of degree [Witt]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
12089 Essences mainly explain the existence of unified substance [Witt]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
12102 Essential properties of origin are too radically individual for an Aristotelian essence [Witt]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
8425 For true counterfactuals, both antecedent and consequent true is closest to actuality [Lewis]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
8424 Determinism says there can't be two identical worlds up to a time, with identical laws, which then differ [Lewis]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / b. Propositions as possible worlds
8420 A proposition is a set of possible worlds where it is true [Lewis]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
20756 Instead of having a nature, man only has a history [Ortega y Gassett]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation
8405 A theory of causation should explain why cause precedes effect, not take it for granted [Lewis, by Field,H]
8427 I reject making the direction of causation axiomatic, since that takes too much for granted [Lewis]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
10392 It is just individious discrimination to pick out one cause and label it as 'the' cause [Lewis]
8419 The modern regularity view says a cause is a member of a minimal set of sufficient conditions [Lewis]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
8421 Regularity analyses could make c an effect of e, or an epiphenomenon, or inefficacious, or pre-empted [Lewis]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
17525 The counterfactual view says causes are necessary (rather than sufficient) for their effects [Lewis, by Bird]
17524 Lewis has basic causation, counterfactuals, and a general ancestral (thus handling pre-emption) [Lewis, by Bird]
8397 Counterfactual causation implies all laws are causal, which they aren't [Tooley on Lewis]
8423 My counterfactual analysis applies to particular cases, not generalisations [Lewis]
8426 One event causes another iff there is a causal chain from first to second [Lewis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
12085 Reality is directional [Witt]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 9. Counterfactual Claims
4795 Lewis's account of counterfactuals is fine if we know what a law of nature is, but it won't explain the latter [Cohen,LJ on Lewis]