Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Causation', 'People and Their Bodies' and 'The Foundations of Mathematics'

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24 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / f. Axiom of Infinity V
13430 Infinity: there is an infinity of distinguishable individuals [Ramsey]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / p. Axiom of Reducibility
13428 Reducibility: to every non-elementary function there is an equivalent elementary function [Ramsey]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic
13427 Either 'a = b' vacuously names the same thing, or absurdly names different things [Ramsey]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 1. Paradox
13334 Contradictions are either purely logical or mathematical, or they involved thought and language [Ramsey]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
13426 Formalists neglect content, but the logicists have focused on generalizations, and neglected form [Ramsey]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 7. Formalism
13425 Formalism is hopeless, because it focuses on propositions and ignores concepts [Ramsey]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
9476 If dispositions are more fundamental than causes, then they won't conceptually reduce to them [Bird on Lewis]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
16209 How can point-duration slices of people have beliefs or desires? [Thomson]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
8425 For true counterfactuals, both antecedent and consequent true is closest to actuality [Lewis]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / d. Cause of beliefs
22328 I just confront the evidence, and let it act on me [Ramsey]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
22325 A belief is knowledge if it is true, certain and obtained by a reliable process [Ramsey]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
8424 Determinism says there can't be two identical worlds up to a time, with identical laws, which then differ [Lewis]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / b. Propositions as possible worlds
8420 A proposition is a set of possible worlds where it is true [Lewis]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation
8405 A theory of causation should explain why cause precedes effect, not take it for granted [Lewis, by Field,H]
8427 I reject making the direction of causation axiomatic, since that takes too much for granted [Lewis]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
10392 It is just individious discrimination to pick out one cause and label it as 'the' cause [Lewis]
8419 The modern regularity view says a cause is a member of a minimal set of sufficient conditions [Lewis]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
8421 Regularity analyses could make c an effect of e, or an epiphenomenon, or inefficacious, or pre-empted [Lewis]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
17525 The counterfactual view says causes are necessary (rather than sufficient) for their effects [Lewis, by Bird]
17524 Lewis has basic causation, counterfactuals, and a general ancestral (thus handling pre-emption) [Lewis, by Bird]
8397 Counterfactual causation implies all laws are causal, which they aren't [Tooley on Lewis]
8423 My counterfactual analysis applies to particular cases, not generalisations [Lewis]
8426 One event causes another iff there is a causal chain from first to second [Lewis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 9. Counterfactual Claims
4795 Lewis's account of counterfactuals is fine if we know what a law of nature is, but it won't explain the latter [Cohen,LJ on Lewis]