30 ideas
| 9476 | If dispositions are more fundamental than causes, then they won't conceptually reduce to them [Bird on Lewis] |
| 11946 | Propensities are part of a situation, not part of the objects [Popper] |
| 8425 | For true counterfactuals, both antecedent and consequent true is closest to actuality [Lewis] |
| 6685 | 'Subjectivism' is an extension of relativism from the social group to the individual [Graham] |
| 8424 | Determinism says there can't be two identical worlds up to a time, with identical laws, which then differ [Lewis] |
| 8420 | A proposition is a set of possible worlds where it is true [Lewis] |
| 6699 | The chain of consequences may not be the same as the chain of responsibility [Graham] |
| 6698 | Negative consequences are very hard (and possibly impossible) to assess [Graham] |
| 6700 | We can't criticise people because of unforeseeable consequences [Graham] |
| 6704 | Egoism submits to desires, but cannot help form them [Graham] |
| 6701 | Rescue operations need spontaneous benevolence, not careful thought [Graham] |
| 6693 | 'What if everybody did that?' rather misses the point as an objection to cheating [Graham] |
| 6691 | It is more plausible to say people can choose between values, than that they can create them [Graham] |
| 6688 | Life is only absurd if you expected an explanation and none turns up [Graham] |
| 6705 | Existentialism may transcend our nature, unlike eudaimonism [Graham] |
| 6690 | A standard problem for existentialism is the 'sincere Nazi' [Graham] |
| 6689 | The key to existentialism: the way you make choices is more important than what you choose [Graham] |
| 8405 | A theory of causation should explain why cause precedes effect, not take it for granted [Lewis, by Field,H] |
| 8427 | I reject making the direction of causation axiomatic, since that takes too much for granted [Lewis] |
| 10392 | It is just individious discrimination to pick out one cause and label it as 'the' cause [Lewis] |
| 8419 | The modern regularity view says a cause is a member of a minimal set of sufficient conditions [Lewis] |
| 8421 | Regularity analyses could make c an effect of e, or an epiphenomenon, or inefficacious, or pre-empted [Lewis] |
| 17525 | The counterfactual view says causes are necessary (rather than sufficient) for their effects [Lewis, by Bird] |
| 17524 | Lewis has basic causation, counterfactuals, and a general ancestral (thus handling pre-emption) [Lewis, by Bird] |
| 8397 | Counterfactual causation implies all laws are causal, which they aren't [Tooley on Lewis] |
| 8423 | My counterfactual analysis applies to particular cases, not generalisations [Lewis] |
| 8426 | One event causes another iff there is a causal chain from first to second [Lewis] |
| 4795 | Lewis's account of counterfactuals is fine if we know what a law of nature is, but it won't explain the latter [Cohen,LJ on Lewis] |
| 6706 | The great religions are much more concerned with the religious life than with ethics [Graham] |
| 6709 | Western religion saves us from death; Eastern religion saves us from immortality [Graham] |