Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Possible Worlds', 'Reference and Definite Descriptions' and 'Against the Logicians (two books)'

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16 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Ordinary speech is not exact about what is true; we say we are digging a well before the well exists [Sext.Empiricus]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / a. Descriptions
Russell only uses descriptions attributively, and Strawson only referentially [Donnellan, by Lycan]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
A definite description can have a non-referential use [Donnellan]
Definite descriptions are 'attributive' if they say something about x, and 'referential' if they pick x out [Donnellan]
'The x is F' only presumes that x exists; it does not actually entail the existence [Donnellan]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
Lewis's distinction of 'existing' from 'being actual' is Meinong's between 'existing' and 'subsisting' [Lycan on Lewis]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
Some properties are inseparable from a thing, such as the length, breadth and depth of a body [Sext.Empiricus]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism
Lewis can't know possible worlds without first knowing what is possible or impossible [Lycan on Lewis]
What are the ontological grounds for grouping possibilia into worlds? [Lycan on Lewis]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
Fools, infants and madmen may speak truly, but do not know [Sext.Empiricus]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
Madmen are reliable reporters of what appears to them [Sext.Empiricus]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / b. Empirical concepts
We can only dream of a winged man if we have experienced men and some winged thing [Sext.Empiricus]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
A definite description 'the F' is referential if the speaker could thereby be referring to something not-F [Donnellan, by Sainsbury]
Donnellan is unclear whether the referential-attributive distinction is semantic or pragmatic [Bach on Donnellan]
A description can successfully refer, even if its application to the subject is not believed [Donnellan]
19. Language / B. Reference / 5. Speaker's Reference
Whether a definite description is referential or attributive depends on the speaker's intention [Donnellan]