55 ideas
10676 | The Axiom of Choice is a non-logical principle of set-theory [Hossack] |
10686 | The Axiom of Choice guarantees a one-one correspondence from sets to ordinals [Hossack] |
10687 | Maybe we reduce sets to ordinals, rather than the other way round [Hossack] |
10677 | Extensional mereology needs two definitions and two axioms [Hossack] |
10671 | Plural definite descriptions pick out the largest class of things that fit the description [Hossack] |
10666 | Plural reference will refer to complex facts without postulating complex things [Hossack] |
10669 | Plural reference is just an abbreviation when properties are distributive, but not otherwise [Hossack] |
10675 | A plural comprehension principle says there are some things one of which meets some condition [Hossack] |
10673 | Plural language can discuss without inconsistency things that are not members of themselves [Hossack] |
10680 | The theory of the transfinite needs the ordinal numbers [Hossack] |
10684 | I take the real numbers to be just lengths [Hossack] |
10674 | A plural language gives a single comprehensive induction axiom for arithmetic [Hossack] |
10681 | In arithmetic singularists need sets as the instantiator of numeric properties [Hossack] |
10685 | Set theory is the science of infinity [Hossack] |
10668 | We are committed to a 'group' of children, if they are sitting in a circle [Hossack] |
9476 | If dispositions are more fundamental than causes, then they won't conceptually reduce to them [Bird on Lewis] |
10664 | Complex particulars are either masses, or composites, or sets [Hossack] |
10678 | The relation of composition is indispensable to the part-whole relation for individuals [Hossack] |
10665 | Leibniz's Law argues against atomism - water is wet, unlike water molecules [Hossack] |
10682 | The fusion of five rectangles can decompose into more than five parts that are rectangles [Hossack] |
8425 | For true counterfactuals, both antecedent and consequent true is closest to actuality [Lewis] |
8424 | Determinism says there can't be two identical worlds up to a time, with identical laws, which then differ [Lewis] |
10663 | A thought can refer to many things, but only predicate a universal and affirm a state of affairs [Hossack] |
8420 | A proposition is a set of possible worlds where it is true [Lewis] |
23125 | Most good social changes are incremental, rather than revolutionary [Gopnik] |
23126 | Conservatives often want peace, prosperity and tolerance, but not social fairness [Gopnik] |
23132 | Conservatives believe obedience and rank are essential to social order [Gopnik] |
23128 | The opposite of liberalism is dogmatism [Gopnik] |
23142 | People are fallible, so liberalism tries to distribute power [Gopnik] |
23143 | Liberals have tried very hard to build a conscience into their institutions [Gopnik] |
23141 | Left-wingers are inconsistent in their essentialist descriptions of social groups [Gopnik] |
23124 | Liberal community is not blood ties or tradition, but shared choices, and sympathy for the losers [Gopnik] |
23127 | Liberal community includes flight from the family, into energetic reforming groups [Gopnik] |
23129 | Right-wingers attack liberal faith in reason, left-wingers attack its faith in reform [Gopnik] |
23133 | Cosmopolitan liberals lack national loyalty, and welcome excessive immigration [Gopnik] |
23138 | Modern left-wingers criticise liberalism's control of culture [Gopnik] |
23139 | Liberalism's attempt to be neutral and colour-blind erases cultural identities [Gopnik] |
23135 | Classic Marxists see liberalism as the ideology of the bourgeoisie [Gopnik] |
23140 | Environmental disasters result not from capitalism, but from a general drive for growth [Gopnik] |
23130 | Popular imperialism gives the poor the belief that their acts have world historical meaning [Gopnik] |
23131 | Patriots love their place, but nationalists have a paranoid ethnic hostility [Gopnik] |
23136 | Liberal free speech is actually paid speech [Gopnik] |
23134 | A 'free' society implies a free market, which always produces predatory capitalism and inequalities [Gopnik] |
8405 | A theory of causation should explain why cause precedes effect, not take it for granted [Lewis, by Field,H] |
8427 | I reject making the direction of causation axiomatic, since that takes too much for granted [Lewis] |
10392 | It is just individious discrimination to pick out one cause and label it as 'the' cause [Lewis] |
8419 | The modern regularity view says a cause is a member of a minimal set of sufficient conditions [Lewis] |
8421 | Regularity analyses could make c an effect of e, or an epiphenomenon, or inefficacious, or pre-empted [Lewis] |
17525 | The counterfactual view says causes are necessary (rather than sufficient) for their effects [Lewis, by Bird] |
17524 | Lewis has basic causation, counterfactuals, and a general ancestral (thus handling pre-emption) [Lewis, by Bird] |
8397 | Counterfactual causation implies all laws are causal, which they aren't [Tooley on Lewis] |
8423 | My counterfactual analysis applies to particular cases, not generalisations [Lewis] |
8426 | One event causes another iff there is a causal chain from first to second [Lewis] |
4795 | Lewis's account of counterfactuals is fine if we know what a law of nature is, but it won't explain the latter [Cohen,LJ on Lewis] |
10683 | We could ignore space, and just talk of the shape of matter [Hossack] |