44 ideas
| 22138 | Science rests on scholastic metaphysics, not on Hume, Kant or Carnap [Boulter] |
| 10676 | The Axiom of Choice is a non-logical principle of set-theory [Hossack] |
| 10686 | The Axiom of Choice guarantees a one-one correspondence from sets to ordinals [Hossack] |
| 10687 | Maybe we reduce sets to ordinals, rather than the other way round [Hossack] |
| 10677 | Extensional mereology needs two definitions and two axioms [Hossack] |
| 10671 | Plural definite descriptions pick out the largest class of things that fit the description [Hossack] |
| 10666 | Plural reference will refer to complex facts without postulating complex things [Hossack] |
| 10669 | Plural reference is just an abbreviation when properties are distributive, but not otherwise [Hossack] |
| 10675 | A plural comprehension principle says there are some things one of which meets some condition [Hossack] |
| 10673 | Plural language can discuss without inconsistency things that are not members of themselves [Hossack] |
| 10680 | The theory of the transfinite needs the ordinal numbers [Hossack] |
| 10684 | I take the real numbers to be just lengths [Hossack] |
| 10674 | A plural language gives a single comprehensive induction axiom for arithmetic [Hossack] |
| 10681 | In arithmetic singularists need sets as the instantiator of numeric properties [Hossack] |
| 10685 | Set theory is the science of infinity [Hossack] |
| 10668 | We are committed to a 'group' of children, if they are sitting in a circle [Hossack] |
| 9476 | If dispositions are more fundamental than causes, then they won't conceptually reduce to them [Bird on Lewis] |
| 22134 | Thoughts are general, but the world isn't, so how can we think accurately? [Boulter] |
| 10664 | Complex particulars are either masses, or composites, or sets [Hossack] |
| 10678 | The relation of composition is indispensable to the part-whole relation for individuals [Hossack] |
| 10682 | The fusion of five rectangles can decompose into more than five parts that are rectangles [Hossack] |
| 10665 | Leibniz's Law argues against atomism - water is wet, unlike water molecules [Hossack] |
| 22150 | Logical possibility needs the concepts of the proposition to be adequate [Boulter] |
| 8425 | For true counterfactuals, both antecedent and consequent true is closest to actuality [Lewis] |
| 22139 | Experiments don't just observe; they look to see what interventions change the natural order [Boulter] |
| 22136 | Science begins with sufficient reason, de-animation, and the importance of nature [Boulter] |
| 22135 | Our concepts can never fully capture reality, but simplification does not falsify [Boulter] |
| 8424 | Determinism says there can't be two identical worlds up to a time, with identical laws, which then differ [Lewis] |
| 10663 | A thought can refer to many things, but only predicate a universal and affirm a state of affairs [Hossack] |
| 8420 | A proposition is a set of possible worlds where it is true [Lewis] |
| 22152 | Aristotelians accept the analytic-synthetic distinction [Boulter] |
| 22156 | The facts about human health are the measure of the values in our lives [Boulter] |
| 8405 | A theory of causation should explain why cause precedes effect, not take it for granted [Lewis, by Field,H] |
| 8427 | I reject making the direction of causation axiomatic, since that takes too much for granted [Lewis] |
| 10392 | It is just individious discrimination to pick out one cause and label it as 'the' cause [Lewis] |
| 8419 | The modern regularity view says a cause is a member of a minimal set of sufficient conditions [Lewis] |
| 8421 | Regularity analyses could make c an effect of e, or an epiphenomenon, or inefficacious, or pre-empted [Lewis] |
| 17525 | The counterfactual view says causes are necessary (rather than sufficient) for their effects [Lewis, by Bird] |
| 17524 | Lewis has basic causation, counterfactuals, and a general ancestral (thus handling pre-emption) [Lewis, by Bird] |
| 8397 | Counterfactual causation implies all laws are causal, which they aren't [Tooley on Lewis] |
| 8423 | My counterfactual analysis applies to particular cases, not generalisations [Lewis] |
| 8426 | One event causes another iff there is a causal chain from first to second [Lewis] |
| 4795 | Lewis's account of counterfactuals is fine if we know what a law of nature is, but it won't explain the latter [Cohen,LJ on Lewis] |
| 10683 | We could ignore space, and just talk of the shape of matter [Hossack] |