Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Extrinsic Properties', 'Semantic Necessity' and 'Regressive Method for Premises in Mathematics'

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21 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
17641 Discoveries in mathematics can challenge philosophy, and offer it a new foundation [Russell]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
17638 If one proposition is deduced from another, they are more certain together than alone [Russell]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
17632 Non-contradiction was learned from instances, and then found to be indubitable [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 8. Theories in Logic
14620 Theories in logic are sentences closed under consequence, but in truth discussions theories have axioms [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
17629 Which premises are ultimate varies with context [Russell]
17630 The sources of a proof are the reasons why we believe its conclusion [Russell]
17640 Finding the axioms may be the only route to some new results [Russell]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 2. Proof in Mathematics
17627 It seems absurd to prove 2+2=4, where the conclusion is more certain than premises [Russell]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
17628 Arithmetic was probably inferred from relationships between physical objects [Russell]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 4. Intrinsic Properties
14979 Being alone doesn't guarantee intrinsic properties; 'being alone' is itself extrinsic [Lewis, by Sider]
15454 Extrinsic properties come in degrees, with 'brother' less extrinsic than 'sibling' [Lewis]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / b. Individuation by properties
15455 Total intrinsic properties give us what a thing is [Lewis]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
14530 The role of semantic necessity in semantics is like metaphysical necessity in metaphysics [Fine,K, by Hale/Hoffmann,A]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism
17637 The most obvious beliefs are not infallible, as other obvious beliefs may conflict [Russell]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
17639 Believing a whole science is more than believing each of its propositions [Russell]
14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction
17631 Induction is inferring premises from consequences [Russell]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
14618 Semantics is either an assignment of semantic values, or a theory of truth [Fine,K]
14621 Semantics is a body of semantic requirements, not semantic truths or assigned values [Fine,K]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 7. Extensional Semantics
14622 Referential semantics (unlike Fregeanism) allows objects themselves in to semantic requirements [Fine,K]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 4. Analytic/Synthetic Critique
14619 The Quinean doubt: are semantics and facts separate, and do analytic sentences have no factual part? [Fine,K]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
17633 The law of gravity has many consequences beyond its grounding observations [Russell]