Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Causation', 'Intro to 'Modality and Tense'' and 'Introduction to Virtue Ethics'

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34 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Philosophers with a new concept are like children with a new toy [Fine,K]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
Possible objects are abstract; actual concrete objects are possible; so abstract/concrete are compatible [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
A non-standard realism, with no privileged standpoint, might challenge its absoluteness or coherence [Fine,K]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
If dispositions are more fundamental than causes, then they won't conceptually reduce to them [Bird on Lewis]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
Objects, as well as sentences, can have logical form [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
We must distinguish between the identity or essence of an object, and its necessary features [Fine,K]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
The three basic types of necessity are metaphysical, natural and normative [Fine,K]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
Metaphysical necessity may be 'whatever the circumstance', or 'regardless of circumstances' [Fine,K]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
Empiricists suspect modal notions: either it happens or it doesn't; it is just regularities. [Fine,K]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
For true counterfactuals, both antecedent and consequent true is closest to actuality [Lewis]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
Determinism says there can't be two identical worlds up to a time, with identical laws, which then differ [Lewis]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
If sentence content is all worlds where it is true, all necessary truths have the same content! [Fine,K]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / b. Propositions as possible worlds
A proposition is a set of possible worlds where it is true [Lewis]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
We may still admire a person's character even if the traits are involuntary [Statman]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
There is a new sort of moral scepticism, about the possibility of moral theories [Statman]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / b. Eudaimonia
With a broad concept of flourishing, it might be possible without the virtues [Statman]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique
Virtue theory isn't a genuine ethical theory, because it doesn't have universal application [Statman]
Promises create moral duties that have nothing to do with character [Statman]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / d. Teaching virtue
Moral education is better by concrete example than abstract principle [Statman]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
Friends express friendship even when no utility is involved [Statman]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
Behaviour may be disgusting or inhumane, but violate no duty [Statman]
The ancients recognised imperfect duties, but we have added perfect duties like justice [Statman]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
Abortion issues focus on the mother's right over her body, and the status of the foetus [Statman]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation
A theory of causation should explain why cause precedes effect, not take it for granted [Lewis, by Field,H]
I reject making the direction of causation axiomatic, since that takes too much for granted [Lewis]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
It is just individious discrimination to pick out one cause and label it as 'the' cause [Lewis]
The modern regularity view says a cause is a member of a minimal set of sufficient conditions [Lewis]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
Regularity analyses could make c an effect of e, or an epiphenomenon, or inefficacious, or pre-empted [Lewis]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
The counterfactual view says causes are necessary (rather than sufficient) for their effects [Lewis, by Bird]
Lewis has basic causation, counterfactuals, and a general ancestral (thus handling pre-emption) [Lewis, by Bird]
Counterfactual causation implies all laws are causal, which they aren't [Tooley on Lewis]
My counterfactual analysis applies to particular cases, not generalisations [Lewis]
One event causes another iff there is a causal chain from first to second [Lewis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 9. Counterfactual Claims
Lewis's account of counterfactuals is fine if we know what a law of nature is, but it won't explain the latter [Cohen,LJ on Lewis]