Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Counterpart theory and Quant. Modal Logic', 'Some Puzzles of Ground' and 'The Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme'

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13 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
Saying truths fit experience adds nothing to truth; nothing makes sentences true [Davidson]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 3. Many-Valued Logic
Strong Kleene disjunction just needs one true disjunct; Weak needs the other to have some value [Fine,K]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
Formal grounding needs transitivity of grounding, no self-grounding, and the existence of both parties [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
Aristotelian essentialism says essences are not relative to specification [Lewis]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
Causal necessities hold in all worlds compatible with the laws of nature [Lewis]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
It doesn't take the whole of a possible Humphrey to win the election [Lewis]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
Counterpart theory is bizarre, as no one cares what happens to a mere counterpart [Kripke on Lewis]
Counterparts are not the original thing, but resemble it more than other things do [Lewis]
If the closest resembler to you is in fact quite unlike you, then you have no counterpart [Lewis]
Essential attributes are those shared with all the counterparts [Lewis]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Without the dualism of scheme and content, not much is left of empiricism [Davidson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
Different points of view make sense, but they must be plotted on a common background [Davidson]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
Criteria of translation give us the identity of conceptual schemes [Davidson]