32 ideas
7426 | Critical philosophy is what questions domination at every level [Foucault] |
9208 | Philosophers with a new concept are like children with a new toy [Fine,K] |
7423 | Philosophy and politics are fundamentally linked [Foucault] |
7420 | When logos controls our desires, we have actually become the logos [Foucault] |
9210 | Possible objects are abstract; actual concrete objects are possible; so abstract/concrete are compatible [Fine,K] |
9211 | A non-standard realism, with no privileged standpoint, might challenge its absoluteness or coherence [Fine,K] |
9476 | If dispositions are more fundamental than causes, then they won't conceptually reduce to them [Bird on Lewis] |
9202 | Objects, as well as sentences, can have logical form [Fine,K] |
9206 | We must distinguish between the identity or essence of an object, and its necessary features [Fine,K] |
9205 | The three basic types of necessity are metaphysical, natural and normative [Fine,K] |
9209 | Metaphysical necessity may be 'whatever the circumstance', or 'regardless of circumstances' [Fine,K] |
9200 | Empiricists suspect modal notions: either it happens or it doesn't; it is just regularities. [Fine,K] |
8425 | For true counterfactuals, both antecedent and consequent true is closest to actuality [Lewis] |
7424 | Saying games of truth were merely power relations would be a horrible exaggeration [Foucault] |
7422 | A subject is a form which can change, in (say) political or sexual situations [Foucault] |
8424 | Determinism says there can't be two identical worlds up to a time, with identical laws, which then differ [Lewis] |
9207 | If sentence content is all worlds where it is true, all necessary truths have the same content! [Fine,K] |
8420 | A proposition is a set of possible worlds where it is true [Lewis] |
7419 | Ethics is the conscious practice of freedom [Foucault] |
7425 | The aim is not to eliminate power relations, but to reduce domination [Foucault] |
7418 | The idea of liberation suggests there is a human nature which has been repressed [Foucault] |
8405 | A theory of causation should explain why cause precedes effect, not take it for granted [Lewis, by Field,H] |
8427 | I reject making the direction of causation axiomatic, since that takes too much for granted [Lewis] |
10392 | It is just individious discrimination to pick out one cause and label it as 'the' cause [Lewis] |
8419 | The modern regularity view says a cause is a member of a minimal set of sufficient conditions [Lewis] |
8421 | Regularity analyses could make c an effect of e, or an epiphenomenon, or inefficacious, or pre-empted [Lewis] |
17525 | The counterfactual view says causes are necessary (rather than sufficient) for their effects [Lewis, by Bird] |
17524 | Lewis has basic causation, counterfactuals, and a general ancestral (thus handling pre-emption) [Lewis, by Bird] |
8397 | Counterfactual causation implies all laws are causal, which they aren't [Tooley on Lewis] |
8423 | My counterfactual analysis applies to particular cases, not generalisations [Lewis] |
8426 | One event causes another iff there is a causal chain from first to second [Lewis] |
4795 | Lewis's account of counterfactuals is fine if we know what a law of nature is, but it won't explain the latter [Cohen,LJ on Lewis] |