17 ideas
10528 | Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K] |
12766 | Logical space is abstracted from the actual world [Stalnaker] |
10529 | If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K] |
10530 | Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K] |
12764 | For the bare particular view, properties must be features, not just groups of objects [Stalnaker] |
11976 | Aristotelian essentialism says essences are not relative to specification [Lewis] |
12761 | An essential property is one had in all the possible worlds where a thing exists [Stalnaker] |
12763 | Necessarily self-identical, or being what it is, or its world-indexed properties, aren't essential [Stalnaker] |
12762 | Bare particular anti-essentialism makes no sense within modal logic semantics [Stalnaker] |
11978 | Causal necessities hold in all worlds compatible with the laws of nature [Lewis] |
12765 | Why imagine that Babe Ruth might be a billiard ball; nothing useful could be said about the ball [Stalnaker] |
11979 | It doesn't take the whole of a possible Humphrey to win the election [Lewis] |
16994 | Counterpart theory is bizarre, as no one cares what happens to a mere counterpart [Kripke on Lewis] |
11974 | Counterparts are not the original thing, but resemble it more than other things do [Lewis] |
11975 | If the closest resembler to you is in fact quite unlike you, then you have no counterpart [Lewis] |
11977 | Essential attributes are those shared with all the counterparts [Lewis] |
10527 | An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K] |