30 ideas
4261 | The Lottery Paradox says each ticket is likely to lose, so there probably won't be a winner [Bonjour, by PG] |
9476 | If dispositions are more fundamental than causes, then they won't conceptually reduce to them [Bird on Lewis] |
8425 | For true counterfactuals, both antecedent and consequent true is closest to actuality [Lewis] |
6230 | If the soul were a tabula rasa, with no innate ideas, there could be no moral goodness or justice [Cudworth] |
6228 | Senses cannot judge one another, so what judges senses cannot be a sense, but must be superior [Cudworth] |
4255 | Externalist theories of knowledge are one species of foundationalism [Bonjour] |
4257 | The big problem for foundationalism is to explain how basic beliefs are possible [Bonjour] |
4256 | The main argument for foundationalism is that all other theories involve a regress leading to scepticism [Bonjour] |
4258 | Extreme externalism says no more justification is required than the truth of the belief [Bonjour] |
4259 | External reliability is not enough, if the internal state of the believer is known to be irrational [Bonjour] |
4260 | Even if there is no obvious irrationality, it may be irrational to base knowledge entirely on external criteria [Bonjour] |
8424 | Determinism says there can't be two identical worlds up to a time, with identical laws, which then differ [Lewis] |
6229 | Sense is fixed in the material form, and so can't grasp abstract universals [Cudworth] |
8420 | A proposition is a set of possible worlds where it is true [Lewis] |
6227 | Keeping promises and contracts is an obligation of natural justice [Cudworth] |
6225 | Obligation to obey all positive laws is older than all laws [Cudworth] |
8405 | A theory of causation should explain why cause precedes effect, not take it for granted [Lewis, by Field,H] |
8427 | I reject making the direction of causation axiomatic, since that takes too much for granted [Lewis] |
10392 | It is just individious discrimination to pick out one cause and label it as 'the' cause [Lewis] |
8419 | The modern regularity view says a cause is a member of a minimal set of sufficient conditions [Lewis] |
8421 | Regularity analyses could make c an effect of e, or an epiphenomenon, or inefficacious, or pre-empted [Lewis] |
17525 | The counterfactual view says causes are necessary (rather than sufficient) for their effects [Lewis, by Bird] |
17524 | Lewis has basic causation, counterfactuals, and a general ancestral (thus handling pre-emption) [Lewis, by Bird] |
8397 | Counterfactual causation implies all laws are causal, which they aren't [Tooley on Lewis] |
8423 | My counterfactual analysis applies to particular cases, not generalisations [Lewis] |
8426 | One event causes another iff there is a causal chain from first to second [Lewis] |
4795 | Lewis's account of counterfactuals is fine if we know what a law of nature is, but it won't explain the latter [Cohen,LJ on Lewis] |
6224 | An omnipotent will cannot make two things equal or alike if they aren't [Cudworth] |
6223 | If the will and pleasure of God controls justice, then anything wicked or unjust would become good if God commanded it [Cudworth] |
6226 | The requirement that God must be obeyed must precede any authority of God's commands [Cudworth] |