Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Counterpart theory and Quant. Modal Logic', 'Philosophy of Mathematics' and 'The Trouble with Possible Worlds'

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17 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
15787 Maybe Ockham's Razor is a purely aesthetic principle [Lycan]
15784 The Razor seems irrelevant for Meinongians, who allow absolutely everything to exist [Lycan]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 8. Impredicative Definition
10882 Predicative definitions only refer to entities outside the defined collection [Horsten]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 2. Isomorphisms
10884 A theory is 'categorical' if it has just one model up to isomorphism [Horsten]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 2. Proof in Mathematics
10885 Computer proofs don't provide explanations [Horsten]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
10881 The concept of 'ordinal number' is set-theoretic, not arithmetical [Horsten]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
15792 Maybe non-existent objects are sets of properties [Lycan]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
11976 Aristotelian essentialism says essences are not relative to specification [Lewis]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
11978 Causal necessities hold in all worlds compatible with the laws of nature [Lewis]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
15795 Treating possible worlds as mental needs more actual mental events [Lycan]
15796 Possible worlds must be made of intensional objects like propositions or properties [Lycan]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / c. Worlds as propositions
15794 If 'worlds' are sentences, and possibility their consistency, consistency may rely on possibility [Lycan]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
11979 It doesn't take the whole of a possible Humphrey to win the election [Lewis]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
16994 Counterpart theory is bizarre, as no one cares what happens to a mere counterpart [Kripke on Lewis]
11974 Counterparts are not the original thing, but resemble it more than other things do [Lewis]
11975 If the closest resembler to you is in fact quite unlike you, then you have no counterpart [Lewis]
11977 Essential attributes are those shared with all the counterparts [Lewis]