52 ideas
18730 | The history of philosophy only matters if the subject is a choice between rival theories [Wittgenstein] |
18704 | Philosophy tries to be rid of certain intellectual puzzles, irrelevant to daily life [Wittgenstein] |
6851 | We overvalue whether arguments are valid, and undervalue whether they are interesting [Monk] |
18710 | Philosophers express puzzlement, but don't clearly state the puzzle [Wittgenstein] |
18732 | We don't need a theory of truth, because we use the word perfectly well [Wittgenstein] |
18714 | We already know what we want to know, and analysis gives us no new facts [Wittgenstein] |
18706 | Words of the same kind can be substituted in a proposition without producing nonsense [Wittgenstein] |
18719 | Grammar says that saying 'sound is red' is not false, but nonsense [Wittgenstein] |
18735 | Talking nonsense is not following the rules [Wittgenstein] |
18731 | There is no theory of truth, because it isn't a concept [Wittgenstein] |
18707 | All thought has the logical form of reality [Wittgenstein] |
18724 | In logic nothing is hidden [Wittgenstein] |
18709 | Laws of logic are like laws of chess - if you change them, it's just a different game [Wittgenstein] |
18736 | Contradiction is between two rules, not between rule and reality [Wittgenstein] |
18723 | We may correctly use 'not' without making the rule explicit [Wittgenstein] |
18718 | Saying 'and' has meaning is just saying it works in a sentence [Wittgenstein] |
18727 | A person's name doesn't mean their body; bodies don't sit down, and their existence can be denied [Wittgenstein] |
18738 | We don't get 'nearer' to something by adding decimals to 1.1412... (root-2) [Wittgenstein] |
18708 | Infinity is not a number, so doesn't say how many; it is the property of a law [Wittgenstein] |
18737 | There are no positive or negative facts; these are just the forms of propositions [Wittgenstein] |
9476 | If dispositions are more fundamental than causes, then they won't conceptually reduce to them [Bird on Lewis] |
18715 | Using 'green' is a commitment to future usage of 'green' [Wittgenstein] |
8425 | For true counterfactuals, both antecedent and consequent true is closest to actuality [Lewis] |
18726 | For each necessity in the world there is an arbitrary rule of language [Wittgenstein] |
18712 | Understanding is translation, into action or into other symbols [Wittgenstein] |
18280 | We live in sense-data, but talk about physical objects [Wittgenstein] |
18729 | Part of what we mean by stating the facts is the way we tend to experience them [Wittgenstein] |
18734 | If you remember wrongly, then there must be some other criterion than your remembering [Wittgenstein] |
18721 | Explanation and understanding are the same [Wittgenstein] |
18720 | Explanation gives understanding by revealing the full multiplicity of the thing [Wittgenstein] |
18716 | A machine strikes us as being a rule of movement [Wittgenstein] |
18713 | If an explanation is good, the symbol is used properly in the future [Wittgenstein] |
8424 | Determinism says there can't be two identical worlds up to a time, with identical laws, which then differ [Lewis] |
18717 | Thought is an activity which we perform by the expression of it [Wittgenstein] |
18725 | A proposition draws a line around the facts which agree with it [Wittgenstein] |
18728 | The meaning of a proposition is the mode of its verification [Wittgenstein] |
18705 | Words function only in propositions, like levers in a machine [Wittgenstein] |
18711 | A proposition is any expression which can be significantly negated [Wittgenstein] |
8420 | A proposition is a set of possible worlds where it is true [Lewis] |
6850 | Wittgenstein pared his life down in his search for decency [Monk] |
8405 | A theory of causation should explain why cause precedes effect, not take it for granted [Lewis, by Field,H] |
8427 | I reject making the direction of causation axiomatic, since that takes too much for granted [Lewis] |
10392 | It is just individious discrimination to pick out one cause and label it as 'the' cause [Lewis] |
8419 | The modern regularity view says a cause is a member of a minimal set of sufficient conditions [Lewis] |
8421 | Regularity analyses could make c an effect of e, or an epiphenomenon, or inefficacious, or pre-empted [Lewis] |
17525 | The counterfactual view says causes are necessary (rather than sufficient) for their effects [Lewis, by Bird] |
17524 | Lewis has basic causation, counterfactuals, and a general ancestral (thus handling pre-emption) [Lewis, by Bird] |
8397 | Counterfactual causation implies all laws are causal, which they aren't [Tooley on Lewis] |
8423 | My counterfactual analysis applies to particular cases, not generalisations [Lewis] |
8426 | One event causes another iff there is a causal chain from first to second [Lewis] |
4795 | Lewis's account of counterfactuals is fine if we know what a law of nature is, but it won't explain the latter [Cohen,LJ on Lewis] |
18733 | Laws of nature are an aspect of the phenomena, and are just our mode of description [Wittgenstein] |