14 ideas
11976 | Aristotelian essentialism says essences are not relative to specification [Lewis] |
11978 | Causal necessities hold in all worlds compatible with the laws of nature [Lewis] |
11979 | It doesn't take the whole of a possible Humphrey to win the election [Lewis] |
16994 | Counterpart theory is bizarre, as no one cares what happens to a mere counterpart [Kripke on Lewis] |
11974 | Counterparts are not the original thing, but resemble it more than other things do [Lewis] |
11975 | If the closest resembler to you is in fact quite unlike you, then you have no counterpart [Lewis] |
11977 | Essential attributes are those shared with all the counterparts [Lewis] |
3296 | Sense-data are a false objectification of what is essentially subjective [Nagel] |
3295 | Inner v outer brings astonishment that we are a particular person [Nagel] |
3293 | If you assert that we have an ego, you can still ask if that future ego will be me [Nagel] |
22419 | 'I' is a subject in 'I am in pain' and an object in 'I am bleeding' [Wittgenstein, by McGinn] |
3292 | The most difficult problem of free will is saying what the problem is [Nagel] |
6318 | The doctrine of indeterminacy of translation seems implied by the later Wittgenstein [Wittgenstein, by Quine] |
3294 | As far as possible we should become instruments to realise what is best from an eternal point of view [Nagel] |