Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mad Pain and Martian Pain', 'Individuals without Sortals' and 'Towards a Universal Characteristic'

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21 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
19370 'Blind thought' is reasoning without recognition of the ingredients of the reasoning [Leibniz, by Arthur,R]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 5. Incompleteness
19391 We can assign a characteristic number to every single object [Leibniz]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / d. Counting via concepts
17518 Counting 'coin in this box' may have coin as the unit, with 'in this box' merely as the scope [Ayers]
17516 If counting needs a sortal, what of things which fall under two sortals? [Ayers]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / g. Applying mathematics
19390 Everything is subsumed under number, which is a metaphysical statics of the universe, revealing powers [Leibniz]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
17520 Events do not have natural boundaries, and we have to set them [Ayers]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
17519 To express borderline cases of objects, you need the concept of an 'object' [Ayers]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
17510 Speakers need the very general category of a thing, if they are to think about it [Ayers]
17522 We use sortals to classify physical objects by the nature and origin of their unity [Ayers]
17515 Seeing caterpillar and moth as the same needs continuity, not identity of sortal concepts [Ayers]
17511 Recognising continuity is separate from sortals, and must precede their use [Ayers]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
17517 Could the same matter have more than one form or principle of unity? [Ayers]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
17513 If there are two objects, then 'that marble, man-shaped object' is ambiguous [Ayers]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
17523 Sortals basically apply to individuals [Ayers]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
17521 You can't have the concept of a 'stage' if you lack the concept of an object [Ayers]
17514 Temporal 'parts' cannot be separated or rearranged [Ayers]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
17509 Some say a 'covering concept' completes identity; others place the concept in the reference [Ayers]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
17512 If diachronic identities need covering concepts, why not synchronic identities too? [Ayers]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 4. Causal Functionalism
7444 Type-type psychophysical identity is combined with a functional characterisation of pain [Lewis]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
7445 The application of 'pain' to physical states is non-rigid and contingent [Lewis]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
7443 A theory must be mixed, to cover qualia without behaviour, and behaviour without qualia [Lewis, by PG]