Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Putnam's Paradox', 'Mathematical Explanation' and 'Evidentialism'

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12 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 2. Isomorphisms
A consistent theory just needs one model; isomorphic versions will do too, and large domains provide those [Lewis]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
Anti-realists see the world as imaginary, or lacking joints, or beyond reference, or beyond truth [Lewis]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
A gerrymandered mereological sum can be a mess, but still have natural joints [Lewis]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
Particular essence is often captured by generality [Steiner,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / b. Evidentialism
We could know the evidence for our belief without knowing why it is such evidence [Mittag]
Evidentialism can't explain that we accept knowledge claims if the evidence is forgotten [Mittag]
Evidentialism concerns the evidence for the proposition, not for someone to believe it [Mittag]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
Coherence theories struggle with the role of experience [Mittag]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
Maybe an instance of a generalisation is more explanatory than the particular case [Steiner,M]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / m. Explanation by proof
Explanatory proofs rest on 'characterizing properties' of entities or structure [Steiner,M]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
Causal theories of reference make errors in reference easy [Lewis]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
Descriptive theories remain part of the theory of reference (with seven mild modifications) [Lewis]