Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'An Argument for the Identity Theory', 'Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason' and 'Semantics for Natural Languages'

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8 ideas

17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 4. Causal Functionalism
7441 Experiences are defined by their causal role, and causal roles belong to physical states [Lewis]
7442 'Pain' contingently names the state that occupies the causal role of pain [Lewis]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
15160 Davidson rejected ordinary meaning, and just used truth and reference instead [Davidson, by Soames]
14612 Davidson aimed to show that language is structured by first-order logic [Davidson, by Smart]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
20034 Intentions must be mutually consistent, affirm appropriate means, and fit the agent's beliefs [Bratman, by Wilson/Schpall]
20033 Intentions are normative, requiring commitment and further plans [Bratman, by Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / b. Types of intention
20026 Intention is either the aim of an action, or a long-term constraint on what we can do [Bratman, by Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / c. Reducing intentions
20032 Bratman rejected reducing intentions to belief-desire, because they motivate, and have their own standards [Bratman, by Wilson/Schpall]