Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Causal Explanation', 'Presupposition' and 'The Problem of Consciousness'

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16 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 6. Verisimilitude
Verisimilitude has proved hard to analyse, and seems to have several components [Lewis]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 3. Term Logic
Logic would be more natural if negation only referred to predicates [Dummett]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / c. not
Natural language 'not' doesn't apply to sentences [Dummett]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
A disposition needs a causal basis, a property in a certain causal role. Could the disposition be the property? [Lewis]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 7. Chance
We can explain a chance event, but can never show why some other outcome did not occur [Lewis]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
Does a good explanation produce understanding? That claim is just empty [Lewis]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
Science may well pursue generalised explanation, rather than laws [Lewis]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / f. Necessity in explanations
A good explanation is supposed to show that the event had to happen [Lewis]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
Lewis endorses the thesis that all explanation of singular events is causal explanation [Lewis, by Psillos]
To explain an event is to provide some information about its causal history [Lewis]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 6. Mysterianism
McGinn invites surrender, by saying it is hopeless trying to imagine conscious machines [Dennett on McGinn]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
Multiple realisability rules out hidden essences and experts as the source of water- and gold-concepts [McGinn]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
Explaining match lighting in general is like explaining one lighting of a match [Lewis]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
Ways of carving causes may be natural, but never 'right' [Lewis]
We only pick 'the' cause for the purposes of some particular enquiry. [Lewis]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
Causal dependence is counterfactual dependence between events [Lewis]