10 ideas
10838 | To explain a concept, we need its purpose, not just its rules of usage [Dummett] |
10837 | It is part of the concept of truth that we aim at making true statements [Dummett] |
10840 | We must be able to specify truths in a precise language, like winning moves in a game [Dummett] |
19171 | Tarski's truth is like rules for winning games, without saying what 'winning' means [Dummett, by Davidson] |
14361 | Lewis says indicative conditionals are truth-functional [Lewis, by Jackson] |
8434 | In good counterfactuals the consequent holds in world like ours except that the antecedent is true [Lewis, by Horwich] |
10839 | You can't infer a dog's abstract concepts from its behaviour [Dummett] |
14894 | Indexicals have a 'character' (the standing meaning), and a 'content' (truth-conditions for one context) [Kaplan, by Macià/Garcia-Carpentiro] |
14700 | 'Content' gives the standard modal profile, and 'character' gives rules for a context [Kaplan, by Schroeter] |
9419 | A law of nature is a general axiom of the deductive system that is best for simplicity and strength [Lewis] |