9 ideas
10838 | To explain a concept, we need its purpose, not just its rules of usage [Dummett] |
10837 | It is part of the concept of truth that we aim at making true statements [Dummett] |
10840 | We must be able to specify truths in a precise language, like winning moves in a game [Dummett] |
19171 | Tarski's truth is like rules for winning games, without saying what 'winning' means [Dummett, by Davidson] |
15789 | Lewis's distinction of 'existing' from 'being actual' is Meinong's between 'existing' and 'subsisting' [Lycan on Lewis] |
10269 | Mathematics eliminates possibility, as being simultaneous actuality in sets [Putnam] |
15790 | Lewis can't know possible worlds without first knowing what is possible or impossible [Lycan on Lewis] |
15791 | What are the ontological grounds for grouping possibilia into worlds? [Lycan on Lewis] |
10839 | You can't infer a dog's abstract concepts from its behaviour [Dummett] |