36 ideas
20320 | Truth is what unites, and the profound truths create a community [Jaspers] |
8166 | Truth is part of semantics, since valid inference preserves truth [Dummett] |
8173 | Language can violate bivalence because of non-referring terms or ill-defined predicates [Dummett] |
8179 | The law of excluded middle is the logical reflection of the principle of bivalence [Dummett] |
15533 | We can quantify over fictions by quantifying for real over their names [Lewis] |
15534 | We could quantify over impossible objects - as bundles of properties [Lewis] |
15532 | 'Allists' embrace the existence of all controversial entities; 'noneists' reject all but the obvious ones [Lewis] |
15535 | We can't accept a use of 'existence' that says only some of the things there are actually exist [Lewis] |
8184 | Philosophers should not presume reality, but only invoke it when language requires it [Dummett] |
8185 | We can't make sense of a world not apprehended by a mind [Dummett] |
8163 | Since 'no bird here' and 'no squirrel here' seem the same, we must talk of 'atomic' facts [Dummett] |
8161 | We know we can state facts, with true statements [Dummett] |
8180 | 'That is red or orange' might be considered true, even though 'that is red' and 'that is orange' were not [Dummett] |
8178 | Empirical and a priori knowledge are not distinct, but are extremes of a sliding scale [Dummett] |
20323 | Freedom needs knowledge, the possibility of arbitrariness, and law [Jaspers] |
20322 | I am aware that freedom is possible, and the freedom is not in theory, but in seeking freedom [Jaspers] |
8174 | The theories of meaning and understanding are the only routes to an account of thought [Dummett] |
8175 | A theory of thought will include propositional attitudes as well as propositions [Dummett] |
8165 | To 'abstract from' is a logical process, as opposed to the old mental view [Dummett] |
8168 | To know the truth-conditions of a sentence, you must already know the meaning [Dummett] |
8181 | A justificationist theory of meaning leads to the rejection of classical logic [Dummett] |
8182 | Verificationism could be realist, if we imagined the verification by a superhuman power [Dummett] |
8183 | If truths about the past depend on memories and current evidence, the past will change [Dummett] |
8176 | We could only guess the meanings of 'true' and 'false' when sentences were used [Dummett] |
8170 | Sentences are the primary semantic units, because they can say something [Dummett] |
8169 | We can't distinguish a proposition from its content [Dummett] |
20324 | My freedom increases as I broaden my vision of possiblities and motives [Jaspers] |
20318 | My helplessness in philosophising reveals my being, and begins its upsurge [Jaspers] |
20321 | The struggle for Existenz is between people who are equals, and are utterly honest [Jaspers] |
20325 | Once we grasp freedom 'from' things, then freedom 'for' things becomes urgent [Jaspers] |
20317 | Mundane existence is general, falling under universals, but Existens is unique to individuals [Jaspers] |
20319 | We want the correct grasp on being that is neither solipsism nor absorption in the crowd [Jaspers] |
20315 | 'Existenz' is the potential being, which I could have, and ought to have [Jaspers] |
20316 | Every decision I make moves towards or away from fulfilled Existenz [Jaspers] |
8186 | Time is the measure of change, so we can't speak of time before all change [Dummett] |
8167 | If Presentism is correct, we cannot even say that the present changes [Dummett] |