13 ideas
6259 | Why can't a wise man doubt everything? [Montaigne] |
6263 | No wisdom could make us comfortably walk a wide beam if it was high in the air [Montaigne] |
13966 | Analytic philosophy loved the necessary a priori analytic, linguistic modality, and rigour [Soames] |
13974 | If philosophy is analysis of meaning, available to all competent speakers, what's left for philosophers? [Soames] |
6258 | Virtue is the distinctive mark of truth, and its greatest product [Montaigne] |
16456 | For modality Lewis rejected boxes and diamonds, preferring worlds, and an index for the actual one [Lewis, by Stalnaker] |
6262 | We lack some sense or other, and hence objects may have hidden features [Montaigne] |
13969 | Kripkean essential properties and relations are necessary, in all genuinely possible worlds [Soames] |
13973 | A key achievement of Kripke is showing that important modalities are not linguistic in source [Soames] |
13968 | Kripkean possible worlds are abstract maximal states in which the real world could have been [Soames] |
6260 | Sceptics say there is truth, but no means of making or testing lasting judgements [Montaigne] |
6261 | The soul is in the brain, as shown by head injuries [Montaigne] |
13972 | Two-dimensionalism reinstates descriptivism, and reconnects necessity and apriority to analyticity [Soames] |