Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Counterpart theory and Quant. Modal Logic', 'Declaration of the Rights of Man' and 'Essential Attribution'

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24 ideas

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
11181 Aristotelian essentialism involves a 'natural' or 'causal' interpretation of modal operators [Marcus (Barcan)]
11184 Aristotelian essentialism is about shared properties, individuating essentialism about distinctive properties [Marcus (Barcan)]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
11976 Aristotelian essentialism says essences are not relative to specification [Lewis]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
11180 Essentialist sentences are not theorems of modal logic, and can even be false [Marcus (Barcan)]
11186 'Essentially' won't replace 'necessarily' for vacuous properties like snub-nosed or self-identical [Marcus (Barcan)]
11185 'Is essentially' has a different meaning from 'is necessarily', as they often cannot be substituted [Marcus (Barcan)]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
11182 If essences are objects with only essential properties, they are elusive in possible worlds [Marcus (Barcan)]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
11978 Causal necessities hold in all worlds compatible with the laws of nature [Lewis]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
11183 The use of possible worlds is to sort properties (not to individuate objects) [Marcus (Barcan)]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
11187 In possible worlds, names are just neutral unvarying pegs for truths and predicates [Marcus (Barcan)]
11979 It doesn't take the whole of a possible Humphrey to win the election [Lewis]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
16994 Counterpart theory is bizarre, as no one cares what happens to a mere counterpart [Kripke on Lewis]
11974 Counterparts are not the original thing, but resemble it more than other things do [Lewis]
11975 If the closest resembler to you is in fact quite unlike you, then you have no counterpart [Lewis]
11977 Essential attributes are those shared with all the counterparts [Lewis]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
19855 The purpose of society is to protect the rights of liberty, property, security and resistance [Mirabeau/committee]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / d. General will
19856 The law expresses the general will, and all citizens can participate [Mirabeau/committee]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 3. Constitutions
19861 There is only a constitution if rights are assured, and separation of powers defined [Mirabeau/committee]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 2. Freedom of belief
19858 No one should be molested for their opinions, if they do not disturb the established order [Mirabeau/committee]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 3. Free speech
19859 Free speech is very precious, and everyone may speak and write freely (but take responsibility for it) [Mirabeau/committee]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 2. Political equality
19857 All citizens are eligible for roles in the state, purely on the basis of merit [Mirabeau/committee]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 4. Property rights
19862 Property is a sacred right, breached only when essential, and with fair compensation [Mirabeau/committee]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 4. Taxation
19860 Everyone must contribute to the state's power and administration, in just proportion [Mirabeau/committee]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
11189 Dispositional essences are special, as if an object loses them they cease to exist [Marcus (Barcan)]