Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Subjectivist's Guide to Objective Chance', 'Sets, Aggregates and Numbers' and 'Counterparts and Identity'

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11 ideas

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
To say there could have been people who don't exist, but deny those possible things, rejects Barcan [Stalnaker, by Rumfitt]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
How many? must first partition an aggregate into sets, and then logic fixes its number [Yourgrau]
Nothing is 'intrinsically' numbered [Yourgrau]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / c. Fregean numbers
Defining 'three' as the principle of collection or property of threes explains set theory definitions [Yourgrau]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / b. Mathematics is not set theory
We can't use sets as foundations for mathematics if we must await results from the upper reaches [Yourgrau]
You can ask all sorts of numerical questions about any one given set [Yourgrau]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
Unlike Lewis, I defend an actualist version of counterpart theory [Stalnaker]
If possible worlds really differ, I can't be in more than one at a time [Stalnaker]
If counterparts exist strictly in one world only, this seems to be extreme invariant essentialism [Stalnaker]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
Extensional semantics has individuals and sets; modal semantics has intensions, functions of world to extension [Stalnaker]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / b. Best system theory
Lewis later proposed the axioms at the intersection of the best theories (which may be few) [Mumford on Lewis]