Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Noneism or Allism?', 'Analyticity Reconsidered' and 'Axiomatic Thought'

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23 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
9376 A sentence may simultaneously define a term, and also assert a fact [Boghossian]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
15533 We can quantify over fictions by quantifying for real over their names [Lewis]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
15534 We could quantify over impossible objects - as bundles of properties [Lewis]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 2. Formal Truth
9375 Conventionalism agrees with realists that logic has truth values, but not over the source [Boghossian]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
17963 The facts of geometry, arithmetic or statics order themselves into theories [Hilbert]
17966 Axioms must reveal their dependence (or not), and must be consistent [Hilbert]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 2. Proof in Mathematics
17967 To decide some questions, we must study the essence of mathematical proof itself [Hilbert]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 3. Axioms for Geometry
17965 The whole of Euclidean geometry derives from a basic equation and transformations [Hilbert]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
17964 Number theory just needs calculation laws and rules for integers [Hilbert]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
15532 'Allists' embrace the existence of all controversial entities; 'noneists' reject all but the obvious ones [Lewis]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
15535 We can't accept a use of 'existence' that says only some of the things there are actually exist [Lewis]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
9369 'Snow is white or it isn't' is just true, not made true by stipulation [Boghossian]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
9367 The a priori is explained as analytic to avoid a dubious faculty of intuition [Boghossian]
9373 That logic is a priori because it is analytic resulted from explaining the meaning of logical constants [Boghossian]
9380 We can't hold a sentence true without evidence if we can't agree which sentence is definitive of it [Boghossian]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 11. Denying the A Priori
9384 We may have strong a priori beliefs which we pragmatically drop from our best theory [Boghossian]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
9374 If we learn geometry by intuition, how could this faculty have misled us for so long? [Boghossian]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / c. Meaning by Role
9378 If meaning depends on conceptual role, what properties are needed to do the job? [Boghossian]
9377 'Conceptual role semantics' says terms have meaning from sentences and/or inferences [Boghossian]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 8. Synonymy
9372 Could expressions have meaning, without two expressions possibly meaning the same? [Boghossian]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
17721 There are no truths in virtue of meaning, but there is knowability in virtue of understanding [Boghossian, by Jenkins]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 3. Analytic and Synthetic
9368 Epistemological analyticity: grasp of meaning is justification; metaphysical: truth depends on meaning [Boghossian]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / d. Knowing essences
17968 By digging deeper into the axioms we approach the essence of sciences, and unity of knowedge [Hilbert]