30 ideas
9376 | A sentence may simultaneously define a term, and also assert a fact [Boghossian] |
14239 | The empty set is usually derived from Separation, but it also seems to need Infinity [Oliver/Smiley] |
14240 | The empty set is something, not nothing! [Oliver/Smiley] |
14241 | We don't need the empty set to express non-existence, as there are other ways to do that [Oliver/Smiley] |
14242 | Maybe we can treat the empty set symbol as just meaning an empty term [Oliver/Smiley] |
14243 | The unit set may be needed to express intersections that leave a single member [Oliver/Smiley] |
14234 | If you only refer to objects one at a time, you need sets in order to refer to a plurality [Oliver/Smiley] |
14237 | We can use plural language to refer to the set theory domain, to avoid calling it a 'set' [Oliver/Smiley] |
9375 | Conventionalism agrees with realists that logic has truth values, but not over the source [Boghossian] |
14245 | Logical truths are true no matter what exists - but predicate calculus insists that something exists [Oliver/Smiley] |
14246 | If mathematics purely concerned mathematical objects, there would be no applied mathematics [Oliver/Smiley] |
14247 | Sets might either represent the numbers, or be the numbers, or replace the numbers [Oliver/Smiley] |
11976 | Aristotelian essentialism says essences are not relative to specification [Lewis] |
11978 | Causal necessities hold in all worlds compatible with the laws of nature [Lewis] |
11979 | It doesn't take the whole of a possible Humphrey to win the election [Lewis] |
16994 | Counterpart theory is bizarre, as no one cares what happens to a mere counterpart [Kripke on Lewis] |
11974 | Counterparts are not the original thing, but resemble it more than other things do [Lewis] |
11975 | If the closest resembler to you is in fact quite unlike you, then you have no counterpart [Lewis] |
11977 | Essential attributes are those shared with all the counterparts [Lewis] |
9369 | 'Snow is white or it isn't' is just true, not made true by stipulation [Boghossian] |
9367 | The a priori is explained as analytic to avoid a dubious faculty of intuition [Boghossian] |
9373 | That logic is a priori because it is analytic resulted from explaining the meaning of logical constants [Boghossian] |
9380 | We can't hold a sentence true without evidence if we can't agree which sentence is definitive of it [Boghossian] |
9384 | We may have strong a priori beliefs which we pragmatically drop from our best theory [Boghossian] |
9374 | If we learn geometry by intuition, how could this faculty have misled us for so long? [Boghossian] |
9378 | If meaning depends on conceptual role, what properties are needed to do the job? [Boghossian] |
9377 | 'Conceptual role semantics' says terms have meaning from sentences and/or inferences [Boghossian] |
9372 | Could expressions have meaning, without two expressions possibly meaning the same? [Boghossian] |
17721 | There are no truths in virtue of meaning, but there is knowability in virtue of understanding [Boghossian, by Jenkins] |
9368 | Epistemological analyticity: grasp of meaning is justification; metaphysical: truth depends on meaning [Boghossian] |