Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Counterpart theory and Quant. Modal Logic', 'Events and Semantic Architecture' and 'Remarks on axiomatised set theory'

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12 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
17879 Axiomatising set theory makes it all relative [Skolem]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 3. Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems
17878 If a 1st-order proposition is satisfied, it is satisfied in a denumerably infinite domain [Skolem]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 1. Foundations for Mathematics
17880 Integers and induction are clear as foundations, but set-theory axioms certainly aren't [Skolem]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
17881 Mathematician want performable operations, not propositions about objects [Skolem]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
11976 Aristotelian essentialism says essences are not relative to specification [Lewis]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
11978 Causal necessities hold in all worlds compatible with the laws of nature [Lewis]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
11979 It doesn't take the whole of a possible Humphrey to win the election [Lewis]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
16994 Counterpart theory is bizarre, as no one cares what happens to a mere counterpart [Kripke on Lewis]
11974 Counterparts are not the original thing, but resemble it more than other things do [Lewis]
11975 If the closest resembler to you is in fact quite unlike you, then you have no counterpart [Lewis]
11977 Essential attributes are those shared with all the counterparts [Lewis]
19. Language / B. Reference / 5. Speaker's Reference
21650 No language is semantically referential; it all occurs at the level of thought or utterance [Pietroski, by Hofweber]