Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Causal Explanation', 'Explanatory Coherence' and 'The Rationalists'

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21 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 6. Verisimilitude
15557 Verisimilitude has proved hard to analyse, and seems to have several components [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
15554 A disposition needs a causal basis, a property in a certain causal role. Could the disposition be the property? [Lewis]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
4304 Descartes says there are two substance, Spinoza one, and Leibniz infinitely many [Cottingham]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 7. Chance
15560 We can explain a chance event, but can never show why some other outcome did not occur [Lewis]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
4303 The notion of substance lies at the heart of rationalist metaphysics [Cottingham]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
15559 Does a good explanation produce understanding? That claim is just empty [Lewis]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / c. Explanations by coherence
17064 1: Coherence is a symmetrical relation between two propositions [Thagard, by Smart]
17065 2: An explanation must wholly cohere internally, and with the new fact [Thagard, by Smart]
17066 3: If an analogous pair explain another analogous pair, then they all cohere [Thagard, by Smart]
17067 4: For coherence, observation reports have a degree of intrinsic acceptability [Thagard, by Smart]
17068 5: Contradictory propositions incohere [Thagard, by Smart]
17069 6: A proposition's acceptability depends on its coherence with a system [Thagard, by Smart]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
15556 Science may well pursue generalised explanation, rather than laws [Lewis]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / f. Necessity in explanations
15558 A good explanation is supposed to show that the event had to happen [Lewis]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
4809 Lewis endorses the thesis that all explanation of singular events is causal explanation [Lewis, by Psillos]
14321 To explain an event is to provide some information about its causal history [Lewis]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
15555 Explaining match lighting in general is like explaining one lighting of a match [Lewis]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
15551 Ways of carving causes may be natural, but never 'right' [Lewis]
15552 We only pick 'the' cause for the purposes of some particular enquiry. [Lewis]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
15553 Causal dependence is counterfactual dependence between events [Lewis]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
4306 For rationalists, it is necessary that effects be deducible from their causes [Cottingham]